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We discuss the role of contracting impediments created by the existence of national
borders on open economy growth. In a two-good neoclassical Ramsey growth model with
lack of enforcement on international trade contracts we show that endogenous trading
constraints with positive trade may arise on the transition path towards an open-economy
steady state. These constraints may bind more severely low-income economies. Dynamic
incentives to ful￿ll international contracts are easier to provide to high-income agents
that have a stronger love-of-variety and investment motives to trade internationally.
Investment in capital serves thus as a commitment device.
The extent of the impediments may render countries unable to engage in international
exchange at all, in e￿ect keeping them in a poverty trap. Countries with dissimilar
initial capital per capita may converge to di￿erent steady states. Contracting problems
in international exchange may block the channel through which, as many researchers
believe, international trade a￿ects growth by increasing investment rates.
The model provides a new explanation for the correlations observed in the data, for
example that the trade/GDP ratio across countries is positively related with income
per capita. Our model and its extensions add to the understanding of a number of
puzzles (inter alia "the missing trade") in international economics. Using new data on
trade credit in international transactions we provide correlations supporting the view
that collection risks hinder international exchange. Policy implications stress the role of
promoting contract enforcement and trade liberalization.
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11 Introduction
National borders introduce a separation between judicial systems of countries causing po-
tential enforcement problems of international contracts to arise. Counterparties might not
be willing or able to commit to ful￿ll trade contracts as readily as they would in domestic
transactions. International trade carries with itself contractual risks that might be idiosyn-
cratic and uninsurable. The risk of the exporter is not getting paid; the risk of the importer
is nondelivery, de￿cient quality or late arrival of goods. Across the border it may not be easy
to verify the reliability of a counterparty or take into consideration all arising contingencies
while writing contracts. All these contracting di￿culties might also prevent granting trade
credit to attract buyers. In short, the existence of borders hinders proper execution of con-
tracts.1 Questions arise about how this a￿ects international exchange and allocations. Can
contractual imperfections caused by the border have a qualitative e￿ect through trade on
growth? Can the ability to trade be income-dependent? Can we explain from a contracting
point of view why the trade/GDP ratio of some countries is so high while that of others so
low?
To study the aforementioned questions in more depth we need to modify the open-economy
version of a one-sector one-good neoclassical model of growth stemming from Ramsey (1928).
This is because in such a model international trade is indistinguishable from capital ￿ows
as the consumption good is the capital good as well. It counterfactually predicts massive
capital ￿ows into economies that are further from their steady state level of capital per capita
relatively to others. Even when transaction costs, faulty government policies or imperfect
contract enforcement that hinder exchange with foreigners are introduced, the growth process
of such a one-good economy is qualitatively unchanged. The welfare of the agents may be
lower and convergence to a steady state might take longer if free trade is unfeasible. If other
fundamentals between economies are the same, there is no variation in the steady state level of
capital per capita between countries (see Marcet and Marimon (1992) or Barro et al. (1995)).
Moreover, at the steady states trade would only exist for consumption smoothing reasons.
Unless the shocks that the economy experiences at the steady state are su￿ciently higher
than those experienced by the economy on its transition path (and assuming no borrowing
is exercised to "jump" to the steady state per capita level) the fact that one observes most
trade between the most developed economies (see the review by Helpman (1999)) cannot be
explained.
In our setup, we allow international trade in ￿nal goods di￿erentiated by origin to take
place while (in order to focus) disallowing pure capital ￿ows.2 We justify this assumption by
noting that developing countries may not produce the whole range of developed countries’
goods. The bene￿ts of a country from trade may stem in many respects from the fact that its
inhabitants can consume more advanced products and import investment goods unobtainable
in the domestic market in autarky. At the same time, locally produced goods may o￿er
some characteristics of foreign products. To capture these considerations and remain as
close as possible to the one-good growth models we analyze allocations that arise in a two-
good economy with home goods and importables being imperfect substitutes in consumption
and perfect substitutes in investment.3 We assume that the terms of trade that the small
1Examples of contracting problems in international trade are given in the Appendix, Section A.2.
2Important future research would be to study the behavior of the current account. We speculate that
allowing for intertemporal borrowing and lending might not change qualitatively our analysis. For example,
in a nonstochastic version of the model of Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) which characterizes optimal
contracts in a bank-project manager relationship the introduction of the outside option that we analyze could
cause that no contracts would be written between the principal and low-income agents.
3This holds regardless of the level of consumption or investment. Therefore, the marginal gain from
international trade even at no international exchange is ￿nite. This is not the ￿rst time that this is assumed
in the international economics literature. Clarida (1990) shows the importance of breaking the Inada conditions
on the utility functions for an existence of a stochastic steady state of an open economy with international
borrowing.
2open economy faces in the world markets cause that investment goods are cheaper for open
economies to obtain. Therefore, in the world with no contracting frictions, trade leads agents
to accumulate more capital relative to the autarkic steady state level.
We view each international trade relationship as having inherent contractual problems.
We build the model on observing how international transactions are conducted. To model the
e￿ects of limited contract enforcement on international transactions, we assume that trade is
sequential in the sense that there is a separation between the shipment and payment for goods.
There is a borrowing element in each international transaction. We set up the model in a
principal-agent framework, where the agent can be understood as a representative consumer-
producer of her home country. The principal exports his goods ￿rst. Each period the agent
faces a temptation to renege on paying back for her imports.4 This introduces a repeated ex-
post moral hazard problem. We use a reputation mechanism to enable international exchange.
The agent ful￿lls current period commitments for fear of being denied future trade and being
con￿ned to autarky forever on. No other punishment for contract noncompliance is available.5
The principal wants to be repaid and realizes that the agent from the small open economy
might be willing to default despite the threat of punishment. Consequently, he might trade
lower volumes with the small open economy than in the world without the contracting friction.
Therefore trading constraints on the volume of exchange available to the agent can arise
endogenously.6
Our analysis delivers the following results. The scope of international market access of
our small open economy is endogenously determined. In our model (contrary to, for example,
the result of Marcet and Marimon (1992)) there might be international exchange on the
growth path even when the agent is unable to commit to ful￿ll contracts at all. The model
can give rise to di￿erent, even nonmonotonic, patterns of openness (measured as the trade
volume/production ratio) as a function of capital. It is the low-income countries that may
become constrained in trade and be unable to exchange ￿rst-best volumes. On the other
hand, it might be the case that as an economy obtains a capital per capita high enough,
it faces no constraints on the optimal amount of trade that it wishes to exchange with the
outside world. We thus overturn the neoclassical result that low-income economies engage
heavily in exchange with the outside world. When constraints on trade bind, the growth of
the small open economy is hindered relative to a world without frictions, because investment
is more costly to the agent. Trade volume is increasing in the level of capital per capita,
4This can have a following decentralized interpretation. In a given economy there are agents that are
either eternally specialized exporters or importers that trade with the outside world. Exporters always receive
payment. Importers can default. Both types of agents trade with each other domestically. A question arises
whether the agents could not send their goods ￿rst to the principal. To validate our assumptions, we note that
the principal need not have the ability to commit either. Moreover, it might be the case that the agents may
not be able to pay cash-in-advance on their purchases, for example because of a lack of a properly functioning
domestic credit market. Another instance when our assumption is valid that is when the agent would be
included in the production chain of the exporter. Then, to add value, she might need to obtain ￿rst some
intermediate products from the exporter.
5This is assumed so that analytical results are obtainable. In extensions we assume some level of contract
enforcement on international contracts (see Section 3.7). We perform simulations for this case and for a model
with "weaker" punishments (for example, an exclusion of a debtor of only few periods from the market). These
modi￿cations do not change the results qualitatively (see Sections 3.9.2 and 3.9.3).
6In modeling we make other simplifying assumptions which do not invalidate the generality of our results.
We assume exogenous technological progress for simplicity, although some studies of the e￿ects of trade
on growth (for example Frankel and Romer (1999) and Coe et al. (1997)) claim that there is a statistically
signi￿cant e￿ect of trade on productivity.
We do not study a speci￿c underlying trade model for two reasons. First, the scope of interest here is on
the e￿ects of limited contract enforcement on exchange and not on the factor content of trade. Second, most
canonical trade models { the Ricardian, the Heckscher-Ohlin, the speci￿c factor and the new trade theory
models { are essentially static and there are many ways one could provide their dynamic versions. See for
example Atkeson and Kehoe (2000), Cunat and Ma￿ezzoli (2004), Deardor￿ (2001) and Findlay (1970) for the
Heckscher-Ohlin model, chapter 6 of Grossman and Helpman (1991) for an endogenous growth model with
monopolistic production or Burgstaller (1986) for the Ricardian model.
3also when the constraints on trade are binding. As capital is accumulated, the constraints
on international trade are loosened. It is easier for the principal to provide incentives to
an agent with a higher income. This is because agents with higher capital have a stronger
love-of-variety motive to trade and are also more dependent on obtaining investment goods
from abroad. Capital investment serves thus as a commitment device { a productive cost
that increases the value of international trade to the agent relative to her default option. An
interesting result in our nonstochastic model is that any easing of constraints in the future {
for example caused by a credible trade reform { allows for more trade today.
The central result of the paper is that a multiplicity of steady states may occur. Countries
with dissimilar levels of initial capital per capita may converge to di￿erent steady state capital
per capita values. An economy may either be con￿ned to autarky (when its capital per capita
is low enough) or participate in international trade forever. In e￿ect, we might have three
groups of countries: those remaining in autarky, those trading a constrained, positive volume
of trade, and those unconstrained in international exchange. In an extreme case, no trade
may be possible with the outside world for any initial capital per capita value. Even with
only one steady state of the system, contrary to the results obtained in a canonical one-good
open Ramsey economy, capital per capita values corresponding to steady states with positive
international trade might be in￿uenced by binding constraints on trade.
In e￿ect, we present a Ramsey growth economy with an in￿nitely-lived representative agent
and poverty traps arising using a mechanism new to the poverty trap literature (see e.g. a
survey in Azariadis and Stachurski (2004)). Limited commitment on contracts introduces
incentive compatibility constraints to the agent’s optimization problem. The nature of the
punishment technology and the fact that it is easier to dynamically provide incentives to
perform on contracts to a high-income agent may render the set of feasible sequences available
to the agent nonconvex. Binding trading constraints a￿ect the programming problem of the
agent similarly to the e￿ect of nonconvexities in technology already known in the literature.
Whenever constraints on trade bind, an agent with an endowment far away from the open
economy steady state capital per capita levels may not obtain full bene￿ts of international
exchange and increase her return on capital to the open-economy ￿rst-best levels. In fact,
whenever the parameters are set so that multiple steady states are present, the agent is
not willing to accumulate enough capital (although she could) to become credible to outside
traders and start international exchange.
Our result is important, because it shows how the bene￿cial in￿uence of international
trade on growth through raising physical rates of investment that many researchers indicate
(see Wacziarg and Welch (2003) for a discussion) may break down because of the inability
to contract. It is exactly the low-income countries that might need international trade and
investment goods (possibly with embodied technology) in order to develop. The contract
enforcement problem in international transactions may be there regardless of the strength
of the local contract enforcement institutions (although, of course, the domestic institutional
setup may be a development problem of its own). It is the existence of the limited commitment
associated with the border itself that causes the contractual problem. One may ￿nd a trade
contract between the U.S. and France as hard to enforce as that between countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, especially for contracts written between small companies. Collection between
countries with di￿erent domestic institutions may be hindered to the same extent due to the
lack of a centralized enforcer.
Our model can also be interpreted as an international lending model with within-period
noncontingent debt contracts. With our framework we are able to sidestep the Bulow and
Rogo￿ (1989) critique of reputational punishment in debt contracts and resuscitate borrowing
and lending on the growth path from capital per capita levels below the steady state ones.
This is not possible for example in the Marcet and Marimon (1992) model where no exchange
in a nonstochastic setup occurs since the agent would always be able to obtain a rate of return
at least as high as the international market rate of interest on the amount she would have to
4repay. The agent in our small open economy is unable to replicate the stream of allocations
o￿ered by the lender upon default because she is shut o￿ from international trade and cannot
obtain the importable. Market exclusion in the hands of international traders is a powerful
punishment tool that supports the reputational argument for lending.
Our framework adds to the understanding of the border e￿ect puzzle ￿rst indicated by
McCallum (1996) where empirical evidence was provided that there is a great deal of "miss-
ing" trade between Canada and the U.S.7 It is in line with the work of Anderson (2000),
Anderson and van Wincoop (2001, 2004), Anderson and Young (2002) as well as the empir-
ical investigation in Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) that stresses contractual impediments
to international trade in static settings. Our model may replicate the stylized facts that low-
income countries trade less than others (see the survey in Baldwin (2003)). The correlation
of the trade to GDP ratio and the level of GDP per capita in PPP terms across countries is
positive in di￿erent samples and across time (see an example in Figure 3). In addition, the
contract terms in trade pertaining to enforcement issues (maximum duration of trade credit
on forfaiting8 contracts) and openness are correlated (Figure 4). In the years with available
data, countries in which counterparties obtain better contract terms trade more than the oth-
ers in relation to their GDP per capita. This measure is also highly correlated with income per
capita. This indicates that there might be a link between income per capita, creditworthiness
and trade volume { as posited in this paper. By endogenizing international market access we
can obtain the patterns observed in both ￿gures: economies with higher capital per capita
may be inherently more open and an average company from a higher income country can ob-
tain better terms on trade contracts.9 In the estimation results of gravity equations that we
present in Section 4 both the importer’s income per capita and our new measure of contract
terms on trade transactions enter signi￿cantly as regressors of our measure of openness. We
￿nd that a 1% improvement in the length of trade credit of an importing country increases
imports normalized by the GDP of the counterparties by 0.15%.
We make an important distinction between the e￿ects of contractual impediments in
trade that we discuss and the iceberg trade costs that Obstfeld and Rogo￿ (2000) propose
after Samuelson (1954) to explain important puzzles in international economics. The iceberg
trade costs will not easily validate the aforementioned correlations without introducing other
imperfections. Lack of contract enforcement cannot be parametrized as a transaction cost
in the way Stigler (1967) stipulated market imperfections could be, since it may change
the properties of the equilibrium. In any case, the existence of the iceberg trade costs can
exacerbate the contracting problem by lowering the gains from trade. With the same iceberg
costs in trade, we can have countries that have totally di￿erent trade/GDP ratios due to the
7Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2000) show that the border e￿ect was stronger for countries that were established
after the disintegration of USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s. This may be some evidence
that the border e￿ect is more severe in economies that have lower income per capita than U.S. and Canada.
8The de￿nition of forfaiting is given in Section A.1.
9As far as the level of real interest rates or interest rate spreads in￿uence the volume of trade credit, there
is a strong negative correlation between openness and these two measures in the same data used here. Of
course, this may be also due to many other factors that are beyond the interest and capacity of this paper {
monetary and exchange rate policy, banking concentration, etc.
Both correlations presented in Figures 3 and 4 may re￿ect a common cause { for example di￿erences in
institutions or geography. A series of papers which recently discussed the empirical relationship between trade,
institutions and growth include Acemoglu et al. (2001), Acemoglu et al. (2002), Clague et al. (1999), Dollar
and Kraay (2003), McArthur and Sachs (2000) and Rigobon and Rodrik (2004). Those stressing geography
include inter alia Frankel and Romer (1999), Easterly and Levine (2002) and McArthur and Sachs (2000).
Institutions are endogenous in each country and therefore need to be modeled. We do not provide such a
framework here. We can interpret limited contract enforcement however as a part of the institutional setup
of an economy. As for geography, when we control for geographical factors such as landlockedness or being
an island, the discussed correlations still hold. The openness-GDP correlation may also be explained by using
some known trade models with modi￿cations { for example by a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model with capital
accumulation with a nontradable sector that is most labor-intensive among sectors. But still then the fact that
traders from low-income economies are also the ones which appear to have larger contractual impediments to
trade is not explained.
5incentive problems in international contracting.
The policy implications of our work stress strengthening contract enforcement. Foreign
counterparties in developing economies need to enjoy the same (high) level of protection from
contract noncompliance as domestic entities. The problem may be, however, that marginal in-
creases in contract enforcement may not remove the constraints on international exchange and
lift a country out of a poverty trap. We also underline the importance of trade liberalization.
Removing trade barriers increases the incentives individuals have to perform on international
trade contracts. Inducing foreign direct investment that could substitute contracts between
unrelated counterparties by intra-￿rm transactions might be another way of overcoming the
constraints on international exchange. Developed countries’ export credit agencies or interna-
tional organizations such as the IMF can play an important role in extending trade credit to
a developing country especially in times of ￿nancial distress and thus easing the contractual
di￿culties in international trade.
The intuition for our results comes from the fact that agents from an economy better
endowed with capital have a higher incentive to trade with the outside world. It will occur
in any trade model where importable prices relative to consumables fall with capital accu-
mulation. For example this happens in a two-factor three-sector dynamic Ricardian model
with a labor-intensive nontradable and when utility and capital accumulation functions are
homothethic in all goods.10 This may happen in the real world for many other reasons. First
of all, high-income economies might produce more complex goods. This may require more
international cooperation. Firms from such economies might also ￿nd it bene￿cial to out-
source labor-intensive production to other countries and reap the bulk of the arising bene￿ts.
Viewed from another angle, richer countries tend to have better contract enforcement systems
that increase the enforceability of international contracts. Good institutions might take time
to be built and be costly. There might be scale e￿ects present in institution building. The
e￿ect can also be delivered by an initial ￿xed cost that needs to be borne to start trading
{ such as a construction of a container port or proper road infrastructure. The particular
mechanism that delivers the results in our model { that richer agents have a stronger love-of-
variety driven incentive to trade { may be only one of the processes that actually occur. In
the model the more of the home good is produced the more there is to gain through diver-
sifying consumption as the marginal utility of the home good decreases. We could also o￿er
a ￿rm-based interpretation of our mechanism using unobserved product quality (in the short
run).11 In all interpretations we require the value of keeping reputation for the studied agents
to increase with their income.
Literature Review
Relating our model to the literature we note that we achieve a possible poverty trap
di￿erently from previous models known in the literature and escape thus the classi￿cation
undertaken by Ho￿ and Stiglitz (1999) who associate a poverty trap with coordination fail-
ures. Matsuyama (2004) provides a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with a
poverty trap caused by frictions in capital markets where agents cannot commit on repaying
on investment contracts. With the same level of frictions in the capital market in two coun-
tries, interest rates are lower in the country with lower capital per capita. As capital markets
10Upon request the author can provide an extension of the basic deterministic model to the aforementioned
framework. We can show that a derivation of a modi￿ed version of Proposition 5 of the current paper and that
multiple steady states may occur. The curse of dimensionality and the complexity of the theoretical analysis
preclude us from giving a fuller account of that economy.
11The consumer-producer of our model can be reinterpreted as a ￿rm facing revenue functions strictly
concave enough in quantity for its products in home and foreign markets that solves a revenue maximization
problem with ￿rm-speci￿c capital accumulation. As the speci￿c capital is increased, the ￿rm is more willing to
produce high quality goods and not default on quality to pursue short-term gains from impunity in the foreign
market. With this interpretation, ￿rms with higher capital stock are willing to export more and low-capital
ones might be barred from exporting.
6are opened, capital ￿ows out of low-income countries in the search for a higher return. In our
model, there is no friction in the domestic markets { we abstain from the role of domestic
institutions and capital markets on international exchange. The poverty trap that occurs
stems from the way everyday transactions are conducted. It is solely the friction associated
with the border that bites in our model. In a sense, the borrowing constraint in our economy
is endogenously determined. Even with no enforcement in international exchange, the agent
may still trade in our economy, although in Matsuyama’s environment it is impossible. Our
results hold in a setup with in￿nitely-lived agents. His framework should be regarded as
complementary to ours.12
Our model falls into the strand of research on international debt problems.13 Models
that are closest to ours include the work of Marcet and Marimon (1992). These authors
analyzed inter alia a one-good Ramsey growth economy with frictions in international bor-
rowing. Agents in a small open economy were unable to commit credibly to repay the loans
that they would undertake. As a result, the economy in question resembled in simulations a
closed economy, grew slower than an open economy without the friction, and borrowing was
possible only in the neighborhood of the steady state for consumption smoothing reasons.
This was because the Bulow and Rogo￿ (1989) intuition worked: agents with capital far from
the steady state value would default on any commitments, being able to derive higher gains
from home investment after default. Therefore, in a deterministic setting there would be no
lending in the Marcet and Marimon’s economy since there is no incentive mechanism that
can prevent agents from defaulting. Kehoe and Levine (1993) provide a general equilibrium
treatment of enforcement problems in an endowment economy with complete markets and
debt constraints. The agents can possess an inalienable private endowment which cannot be
taken away from them and assets which can change hands. The penalty that can be applied
on agents entails exclusion from intertemporal and interstate trade, but not from the spot
markets. In e￿ect the welfare theorems may not hold and the equilibrium may fail to ex-
ist. A model with two goods is provided by Arellano (2003) where an endowment economy
with tradable and nontradable goods and noncontingent insurance contracts paying o￿ in
the tradable good is analyzed. The di￿erence of our model from these papers is that we
explicitly analyze a growth economy with two goods, its steady states and how market access
can depend on what Kehoe and Levine would label "private" endowment. The penalty for
noncompliance on contracts involves a restriction on future trade which a￿ects the achievable
steady state capital per capita levels of the economy. In our production economy the penalty
structure is di￿erent from that in Kehoe and Levine, involving total market exclusion. As
economies are endowed with more capital per capita, they also become more interdependent
with the outside world and the threat of exclusion is more painful to them.
Our work is also closely related to the analysis of principal-agent optimal contracts in
dynamic lending and investment under limited commitment setup by Thomas and Worrall
(1994) and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004). In both papers the agent can produce a
divisible amount of some good with the funds acquired from the lender. Thomas and Worrall
(1994) study a ￿rm investing in a country when there is a possibility of expropriation. Both
the ￿rm and the country can renege on the contract and the starting size of the loan at
12In our framework, it is also not the non-concavity of the production function (see Dasgupta (1997)),
threshold capital requirements to overcome ￿xed costs, savings or demographic traps as presented in Sachs et
al. (2004), nor an overlapping generations framework with exogenously speci￿ed savings functions as in Galor
(1996) or Deardor￿ (2001) that create the trap. The steady state di￿erence in incomes between countries may
also not be due to specialization in trade in the dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models with one reproducible factor
which share the property that accumulation ends when the factor price equalization set is achieved (Atkeson
and Kehoe (2000), Cunat and Ma￿ezzoli (2004)). Neither are we concerned with hyperbolic discounting and
problems of self-control as in Bernheim et al. (1999) that can render individuals unable to enrich themselves.
We obtain a poverty trap in a Ramsey neoclassical growth model with endogenously determined savings where
a contracting impediment may lead to nonconvexities.
13See for example Atkeson (1991), Cole and Kehoe (1995), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Kehoe and Perri
(2002), Kletzer and Wright (2000) or Kocherlakota (1996).
7the optimal level of investment is non-enforceable. The optimal contract has a backloading
property: loans increase in size over time and following good productivity shocks, but the host
country does not receive any payments until the optimal amount of investment is reached.
This way the lender is repaid on the transition path to the e￿cient loan size while the agent
obtains credible promises of higher future utility. The authors also study a situation in
which there is capital accumulation to the project (that is, investment depreciates slowly
once it is made) which in general may lower the attainable investment level. Albuquerque
and Hopenhayn (2004) built on this model while analyzing a lending relationship where the
borrower can unilaterally default on the loan and extend the basic result by exploring more
general outside option values for the borrower. They study a model in which there might be
a need of some initial ￿xed investment that cannot be overcome by the agent himself. The
pro￿ts could be reinvested by the agent. In their model if the agent possesses initial capital
so that he can pay the initial setup cost, no lending agreement between the parties is needed:
the principal cannot improve the utility of the agent without a loss.
Our framework is di￿erent from both of these papers, and so is the scope of our attention.
We analyze an optimal principal-agent type of contract under balanced trade. We study a risk-
averse agent that can self-￿nance her initial investment (which is productive) in a two-good
model. The outside option in our model { the value of autarky in a growth framework { does
not conform with the assumptions in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) and renders their
contracts not incentive compatible (the outside option for the agent can give a higher utility
than the amount of a loan advanced each period). There is no liquidation value in our model
and there is no collateral to be seized. In both of these papers, if one allowed the recipient
country or the borrower respectively to accumulate capital on their own starting with some
initial nonzero level of capital, there is no reason for lending at the e￿cient level of investment
in a deterministic economy, and agents can obtain the e￿cient level of capital on their own.
In our model, once the trade relationship is destroyed, the optimal (from the agent’s point
of view) level of investment in the economy declines. The similarity between our models is
in the fact that no contract might be o￿ered to the agents in need and pro￿table matches
may not be exploited because of the contracting problem. We also have a property that is
similar to the increasing loan size in their models: trade volume strictly increases with capital
endowment on the range where it is positive. Thomas and Worrall’s analysis with capital
accumulation precedes our result that the steady state capital value in the Ramsey model can
depend on the extent of the contracting problem. Expanding the space of contracts beyond
these with balanced trade is clearly necessary when one would wish to study the current
account dynamics or lending to a country by an outside organization such as the IMF or the
World Bank.
There exist models with asymmetric information where the ability to borrow depends on
one’s own endowment relative to the outside world. An example of such is Gertler and Rogo￿
(1990) where contractibility is assumed and informational aspects (hidden information on
investment decisions) play a role. The possibility of saving (a part of) the loan in the outside
￿nancial markets causes an impediment to lending as in Bulow and Rogo￿ (1989). Once
ex-post moral hazard is allowed, however, no lending is possible there in a static setting. We
need to structure long-run incentives to provide contractibility to such transactions. Contrary
to our model, there would always be one steady state if one allowed for capital accumulation.
The volume of lending/GDP predicted by their model is hump-shaped since the funding
requirements decline with the size of the capital on hand. We obtain di￿erent patterns of
trade openness, depending on the strength of the contracting problem. Boyd and Smith (1997)
provide a two-country model where a costly state veri￿cation problem leads to unequal growth
of economies with unequal initial capital endowments.
There is a wide literature on the e￿ect of imperfect contract enforcement on trade that
looks mainly at static frameworks. Anderson and Young (2000, 2002) study how incomplete
contracts in an international setting require intermediation by some superior enforcers (mo-
8nopolists with matching technologies or better enforcement) and that imperfect enforcement
might be deliberately chosen by the weaker sides of the market to capture some of the surplus
created by trade in an endowment economy. Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) provide a static
general equilibrium Ricardian model of trade with endogenous predation where agents play
a noncooperative game in choosing their occupations. The possibility of predation allows the
agents from the poorer economy to tilt the terms of trade into their favor. The parameters
that govern the system include the predation and evasion technologies. Levchenko (2003)
and Antras (2003) study the impact of capital market imperfections on the pattern of trade.
An early model of this sort is provided by Bardhan and Kletzer (1987). In contrast to this
avenue of work, we study the implications of contractual problems on trade volume in a dy-
namic setting. An extension to study the important questions of trade patterns and contract
enforcement is clearly desirable.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. Section 3 charac-
terizes optimal allocations and presents simulations. In Section 4 we discuss the correlations
that exist in the data and reconcile them with our model. Section 5 concludes. Examples,
proofs, ￿gures and tables are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Environment and preferences
A small open economy (further SOE) wishes to trade with the rest of the world. Time
is discrete. There is perfect information in the model and this is common knowledge. It
is populated by an in￿nitely lived representative consumer-producer which we shall call the












t denote the consumption of the goods X and Y respectively at time t. We
also impose the conditions u0 (c) ￿ 0 and u00 (c) ￿ 0 and that marginal utility of consumption
of any good at zero units is not in￿nite (0 < lim
c!0
u0 (c) < 1).14 We make the assumption that
u(0) = 0. An example of a component utility function that satis￿es our assumptions is a
transformed Stone-Geary utility function with u(c) = ln(c + 1). The agent discounts future
utility with a discount factor ￿ < 1.
A risk-neutral principal resides outside the small open economy.
2.2 Production and investment
The agent in the economy has a neoclassical production function of the home good
Xt = X (Kt;Lt) (2)
with capital Kt and labor Lt as the factors of production. The production function sat-
is￿es the Inada conditions in both factors, lim
Kt!0
XK (Kt;Lt) = 1, lim
Kt!1
XK (Kt;Lt) = 0,
lim
Lt!0
XL (Kt;Lt) = 1 and lim
Lt!1
XL (Kt;Lt) = 0. The agent’s initial capital at time 0 is
K0 > 0: She supplies inelastically one unit of labor. In the remainder of the paper we shall
work with the production function in per capita terms (in the intensive form) xt = f (kt) and
capital per capita kt.
14Thus we break the Inada condition on the utility function. The properties of the neoclassical production
function guarantee the existence of a nontrivial steady state. With the Inada condition holding, one could
always provide incentives for agents to trade. To make the analysis interesting, we drop this assumption.
Our assumptions on preferences do not mean that we cannot have homothethic utility in general; the
commonly used CES functions, however, do not conform to our assumptions except for the linear case.
9The investment sector produces capital with a technology using either good X or Y (call
the amounts of the goods it uses respectively Ix
t and I
y
t ). Net investment is linear in home





Capital depreciates at a rate ￿ > 0 per period. Capital, once invested, cannot be con-
sumed.15,16
The production framework is summarized in Figure 1.
Home good X
Exports of X for Y
Consumption
Investment
Foreign good Y Home good X




Figure 1: Production, consumption and investment.
2.3 International trade
To be able to consume the foreign good Y the agent must export her own produce X and
import good Y from abroad. Let pt =
pxt
pyt denote the relative world market price of a unit
of a good X in terms of a unit of good Y at time t. The economy in question is small with
regard to the outside world, so that the decisions of the representative agent do not a￿ect
the world market price. Denote by zt the volume of exports in period t. In each period trade
is balanced so that the agent imports pzt units of good Y . We constrain the world market
price from above so that at a steady state both goods would be consumed when there are no
impediments to trade.17
Since there is no money or banking system in our setup, we model the limited commitment
on contracts in international trade in the following way. We set up a principal-agent problem.
Within each period trade is sequential, i.e. the principal ￿rst ships his goods and then waits
for the reciprocal physical shipment from the agent.18 Thus we assume that instantaneous
15This assumption is made to outrule pathological consumption-savings avenues.
16Another approach one could follow is to use the production framework suggested in Backus et al. (1995).
The foreign goods are used there as intermediate goods to produce a nontradable ￿nal good out of which
consumption and investment are undertaken. The basic result of Proposition 5 is upheld when we alter the
￿nal good production technology to have a ￿nite marginal product of each intermediate input. Unfortunately
this gives less intuitive conditions and trades one group of complexities for another. Simulations that were
carried out for this framework conform with our basic results. The ￿ndings are available from the author upon
request.
17The condition for this is pu0 (pz￿ ￿ Iy￿) ￿ u0 (0), where the starred values denote steady state values of
variables.
In what follows we shall be interested in the case when p ￿ 1 so that imports are more attractive to
consume and invest by the agents of the home country. Alternatively, we could introduce a love-of-variety
investment function.
18This corresponds to the way many international transactions occur: the shipment of the goods precedes
the payment. See Section A.2 for examples of contracting problems in international exchange.
10exchange { barter directly between the counterparties at the borders { is impossible and that
there is a credit element in each international transaction. The ful￿llment of the contract
cannot be enforced at all. The principal supplies the good at world prices earning zero pro￿ts
from the relationship.19
We assume that imports into the economy in question take place ￿rst. This means that
the agent in the SOE is e￿ectively a borrower. She can choose to default on her obligation to
export goods in return for the obtained credit. We assume that if the counterparty defaults
on its obligations it will be punished with market exclusion { a grim trigger strategy { and will
be denied trade in the future in the outside world. This penalty is the harshest the outside
world trader can exercise. We make these assumptions for tractability reasons and to show
that our results carry through in these polar cases. Since there is no other penalty available
to the principal, trade can be sustained only by an implicit promise of future continuation of
exchange.20
2.4 Timing of events
The intra-period timing of events in the SOE is as follows. The agent { the consumer-
producer { uses her capital to produce the home good. Then, a contracted amount of the im-
portable arrives from abroad. The agent makes the decision whether to ful￿ll the export con-
tract, which is the payment for the importable, or not. Finally, the consumption-investment














Figure 2: Timing of intraperiod events of the model.
The symbols t0 and t1 denote subsequent periods.
19In what follows we assume that the principal o￿ers the level of imports to the agent at the maximum
amount that does not make the agent default. In e￿ect we analyze the allocations of the most e￿cient
equilibrium.
20The assumption of no enforcement of contracts greatly simpli￿es the proofs. The addition of partial
enforcement in the model does not change qualitative results. See the discussion in Section 3.7.
At the cost of complicating the model, we could introduce imperfect contract enforcement on the side
of all counterparties. Then, we could assume a randomizing device that would choose each period which
counterparty has to ship their goods ￿rst and become the creditor in the trading relationship. We could also
think about two identical small economies which are taking turns in being the importer and exporter.
Instead of the grim trigger punishment, we could use for example the punishment strategy of the forgiving
trigger, i.e. a rule that the agent could return to international trade after some prespeci￿ed T periods. In such
a case the contracting problem would be more pronounced because the agent would have weaker incentives to
perform on the contract. See Section 3.9.3 for details.
In general the individuals could also su￿er an internal penalty after they default on outside contract along
the lines of the work of Cole and Kehoe (1995).
112.5 Example in an endowment economy
We can o￿er intuition for our results in the following endowment economy. Suppose that




t + 1) + ln(c
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t denote consumption of the home endowment good and the importable and that the world
price is pt = p > 1;8t. Assume that the agent receives each period a constant endowment
x of the home good X. Denote by z the amount of good X traded by the agent.
The Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint for a representative agent in this economy
can be written as
[ln(x ￿ z + 1) + ln(pz + 1)]
1
1 ￿ ￿




The left hand side of the inequality represents the discounted utility from trading forever
whereas the right-hand side shows the utility that the agent can get from defaulting. To
investigate when an agent would default on any amount of trade, we di￿erente both sides of
(4) by z. Taking the derivative at z = 0 (no trade) one can see that for trade to occur it must
be the case that the endowment must be at least as great as some x that satis￿es
x =
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ p
(￿ + p ￿ 1)
Moreover, for any z > 0 at x the condition is violated because the derivative of the default
option increases faster with z than that of complying and continuing with trade. We can also
say that if p = 1;9x: (x ￿ x) ) (z = 0);8￿ 2 (0;1). The property follows from the fact that
one can always ￿nd an endowment low enough so that the marginal utility of consumption of
the home good is higher than the discounted value of the marginal utility of the importable
that is gained through exchange.
This means that agents with low endowment would like to default if they were allowed to
trade. The love-of-variety motive to trade is stronger for agents with higher endowments. An
example of the value functions of the agent in an endowment economy is shown in Figure 5.
Armed with the intuition from the endowment economy, we turn next to the layout of the
model with production and to the characterization of allocations.
3 Allocations
In characterizing the economy, we use dynamic programming methods developed in Rusti-
chini (1998a, 1998b) when incentive constraints are present. We model the agent as choosing
sequences of trade volumes and investment under the requirement that they do not default
on the repayments to the principal. In e￿ect this will give us the characterization of the most
e￿cient equilibrium that o￿ers the entire surplus to the agent and would be chosen by the
principal at time t0 while dealing with an agent with initial capital k0.
Before we discuss the full programming problem, we characterize two polar situations,
one in which the agent can trade frictionlessly with the outside world and one in which she
is con￿ned to autarky. The utility one can obtain under the ￿rst best problem provides the
"maximum prize" the agent can receive to ful￿ll her commitments whereas the latter will
provide the punishment o￿ering the lowest utility possible { the stick to perform in sequential
trade.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix, Section A.3.
3.1 The ￿rst best optimization problem
When the agent from the SOE can engage in international trade with perfect enforcement
across borders we can write the consumption-savings problem of the representative agent in
the SOE as
12Problem 1a


















(state equation) kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + It




(consumption of good X) cx
t = f (kt) ￿ zt ￿ Ix
t
(consumption of good Y ) c
y
t = pzt ￿ I
y
t
(nonnegativity constraints) 0 ￿ cx
t ;0 ￿ c
y
t;0 ￿ Ix
t ;0 ￿ I
y
t ;0 ￿ zt
k0 > 0 given.
The return functions are bounded above and below because of feasibility constraints and
the action spaces are nonempty and compact. By Theorem 4.2 in Stokey and Lucas (1989)
there is a corresponding functional equation to this problem. By Theorem 4.6 of Stokey and
Lucas (1989) the value function exists and is unique.




V (k) = max
Ix;Iy;z
(u(f (k) ￿ z ￿ Ix) + u(pz ￿ Iy)) + ￿V (k0) (6)
subject to
(state equation) k0 = (1 ￿ ￿)k + Ix + Iy
0 ￿ cx;0 ￿ cy;0 ￿ Ix;0 ￿ Iy;0 ￿ z:
We can de￿ne the feasibility correspondence as ￿ft (k) = fk0 : k0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)k + pf (k)g.
Let us gather the properties of this function V (k).
Proposition 1 V (k) is increasing, strictly concave and di￿erentiable almost everywhere in
k.
Notice that if p > 1 then the agent in the economy in question would like to rely totally
on the imported good to ￿nance investment. One can see that in the steady state de￿ned by
a capital per capita at which investment would be equal to depreciation of the capital stock
there would be Ix = 0 because, through exporting the same amount, one could obtain pIx,
which could be divided between consumption of the imported good and investments. In such
a case Ix > 0 only if the constraints on the volume of trade bind; otherwise investing from
domestic product would be dominated. From the ￿rst-order conditions it must be the case
that u0 (cx) = pu0 (cy): Denote by k￿￿￿ the steady state capital per capita level in the no
frictions economy.
The behavior of the trade volume z (k) and the trade/production ratio
z(k)
f(k) depends on
the utility and production functions and the world price. For utility functions of the CARA
and u(c) = log(c + d) (with d as a constant) classes in each consumption good, z (k) is
increasing in k whereas
z(k)
f(k) is decreasing in k from an initial trade/production ratio of one.
In the ￿rst-best world the trade volume/GDP would decrease with capital. This is driven by
investment demand. With no investment outlays, the trade/GDP ratio would be ￿at.
3.2 The optimization problem in autarky
The agent in the SOE might be con￿ned to autarky when no one from the outside world
wishes to trade with him (either because he is being punished or because he would default on
any possible trade volume). Then, he solves the following problem
Problem 1b












13(state equation) kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + f (kt) ￿ ct
(consumption of the home good) ct ￿ 0
k0 > 0 given.
The set ￿(kt) = fkt+1 : kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt + f (kt) ￿ ctg is convex and compact and u(ct)
is a concave function. The restriction that we have on the feasible next-period capital kt+1 2
￿(kt) ensures that our returns are bounded. By Theorem 4:2 of Stokey and Lucas (1989) there
is a functional equation W (k) that corresponds to the sequential problem. All the Blackwell
conditions needed for a contraction hold. Using Theorem 4.6 of Stokey and Lucas (1989)
there is a unique value function of the problem. The value function is continuous and strictly
concave and di￿erentiable almost everywhere by standard results of dynamic programming.
We denote by k￿ the autarky steady state capital level.
3.3 The optimization problem with limited commitment in interna-
tional trade
With the posited friction in international trade, Problem 1 has to be augmented by a non-
default trading constraint. The principal will not allow the agent to borrow more through
trade than what she is willing to repay. Incentive compatibility constraints for the agent (IC)
that need to be respected are required to be added to the problem.
Each period the agent faces an in￿nity of such incentive constraints.21 This is because
the consumption plan chosen by the agent has to be incentive compatible at any time in the
future. Taking into consideration that the agents make the investment-consumption decision
following default or repayment we can state
Problem 2
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i ) + u(c
y
i)) ￿ D￿ (kt;zt) (9)
where D￿ (kt;zt) is the solution to the sequential Problem D.
Problem D




















21Because the analyzed problem is nonstochastic the agents e￿ectively decide about all allocations in the
initial period t = 0 only. Nevertheless, they still face an in￿nity of incentive compatibility constraints that
may constrain the feasible allocations at all other time periods in the future that need to be considered while
optimization in the initial period.
14is the value of defaulting on z amount of trade when the capital level is k. In the ￿rst period,
the agent can consume or invest more of her home good X because she failed to ship the
amount stipulated in their trade contract. After this default, the agent is banned forever from
the international markets and lives in autarky, receiving the discounted utility of ￿W (kt+1)
in the future. Because the supremum is attained in the problem of maximizing utility after
default (we maximize a continuous function over a compact set) we have a value function





















the properties of the default function in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 D(k;z) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and di￿erentiable almost ev-
erywhere in (k;z).
This default option is di￿erent from the one assumed in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn
(2004). Speci￿cally, on some range we have D(k;z) ￿ k
r which is the upper bound on the
outside option of the agents in the paper of these authors.
Let U (k) be the value function corresponding to the value of the sequential Problem 2.
Proposition 3 The value function U (k) exists and is upper-semicontinuous in k.
By strict monotonicity of D in z for a z > 0 we have U (k) ￿ D(k;z) > D(k;0) = W (k).
If at period t it is true that z = 0, U (k) = D(k;0) = W (k). Immediately we see that
U (k) need not be concave in k: Suppose that at k0 in the neighborhood of k trade of some
volume z = " > 0 is possible and optimal, U (k0) ￿ D(k0;") > W (k0) and W (k) is a concave
function. If U (k) is concave but U (k) < V (k) it need not be di￿erentiable at the capital
level k where the trade level ￿rst becomes unconstrained. We denote by k￿￿ the steady state
capital level in this system at which trade occurs.
3.4 A recursive formulation
Thanks to the result in Proposition 3 we can write the recursive formulation of the Problem
2 as
U (k) = max
(z;Ix;Iy)
u(cx) + u(cy) + ￿U (k0) (11)
subject to
k0 = (1 ￿ ￿)k + Ix + Iy
I = Ix + Iy
cx = f (k) ￿ z ￿ Ix
cy = pz ￿ Iy
0 ￿ cy;0 ￿ cx;0 ￿ z;0 ￿ Ix;0 ￿ Iy;
z 2 ￿ \ [0;f (k)] where ￿ = (z : U (k) ￿ D(k;z)).
Let a = (z;Ix;Iy) be a feasible action that satis￿es the above constraints and let A(U;k)
be the feasible action set. Then we can rewrite the problem
U (k) = max
(z;Ix;Iy)2A(U;k)
u(cx) + u(cy) + ￿U (k0) (12)
which will be useful in many of the proofs.
3.5 Characterization of the problem
Before investigating the properties of the value function U (k) we need to de￿ne a few
objects and make observations summarized in Lemmas 1{4. Let
U (k;z) = max
(Ix;Iy)2A(U;k;z)
u(cx) + u(cy) + ￿U (k0) (13)
15where the volume of trade z in the current period is given and A(U;k;z) denotes the feasibility
correspondence given z. Denote by z￿ (k) the ￿rst best volume of trade at k, by ^ z￿ (k) the
optimal volume of trade at k under Problem 2. Furthermore, let z (k) be the largest volume
of trade where U (k;z) = D(k;z) and in case where U (k;z) > D(k;z) for all feasible values
of z take z (k) = f (k). It is true that U (k; ^ z￿ (k)) = U (k).
The following lemmas gather the properties of feasible trade volumes.
Lemma 1 If ￿ z (k) ￿ z￿ (k) then ^ z￿ (k) = ￿ z (k).
This is intuitive; if the agent is constrained in her choices of z, she will choose to trade
the maximum available amount. Thus, for further characterization of the problem, we can
concentrate on studying the behavior of ￿ z (k) in the constrained region.
Lemma 2 Suppose ￿ z (k) > 0. Then z (k) is increasing in k; 8k0 ￿ k: If under Problem D the
agent would choose cx;d > 0 then z (k) is strictly increasing in k;8k0 ￿ k.
The incentives to trade increase with k if trade is feasible. This also means that as the
capital stock increases, the constraint relaxes. The intuition for this is that the love-of-variety
reason to trade is stronger for agents with higher income per capita. We thus obtain a positive
relation between the level of trade and capital per capita in the region where trade occurs
and the constraints are binding the agent. In the model investment in capital serves as a
commitment device for the agent to gain credibility. This investment outlay is productive.
Hence the positive reinforcement: as capital is accumulated, more trade is released to the
agent, and the more the agent is allowed to trade, the more she is willing/able to invest.
What are the properties of optimal paths? The analyzed system is nonstochastic and we
can observe that once the agent starts trading it cannot be in an optimal plan that at a later
date trade is zero. Lemmas 1{2 enable us to show
Lemma 3 Suppose in period t0, ￿ z (k0) > 0. Then ^ z￿ (kt) > 0; 8t > t0.
In Lemma 4 we capture the case when trade is feasible at a later date on the optimal path.
Lemma 4 Take an initial capital per capita k for which the solution to Problem 2 is a unique
sequence of f^ z￿ (kt)g
1
t0 . Then ^ z￿ (kt) > 0 ) ^ z￿ (kt0) > 0;8t0 < t.
This means that if agents are credible enough in the future to be traded with, they will be
able to use this credibility at an earlier date to conduct some trade. They can "cash in" their
future willingness to trade. Therefore, the optimal consumption plan of the agent can either
involve no trade at any period or positive trade at any date. On the optimal growth path,
there is no threshold capital per capita level beyond which the country opens up to trade.
Furthermore, if there exist two steady states of the system we can obtain a reversal of the
behavior of trade/GDP that we have in the ￿rst-best world. We may observe an increasing
sequence of trade if trade is constrained but positive. With only one steady state with trade,
we might obtain this behavior only on some part of the domain (see Section 3.9 for examples).
Lemmas 1{4 give us a quick condition to check whether for a set of parameters trade
always occurs in the optimal allocation. This is captured in Corollary 1 below.
Corollary 1 ^ z￿ (k￿) > 0 ) ^ z￿ (k) > 0;8k > 0:
Whenever we want to check for the existence of no trade with the outside world in this
economy, we need only to analyze the incentives the agents have at the autarkic steady state
capital per capita level k￿. Agents that possess capital per capita endowments lower than k￿
would never trade if the autarkic steady state exists. From the preceding discussion we also
know, however, that if the autarkic steady state does not exist, then agents would trade for
all positive capital per capita endowment levels.
The most complete characterization of the value function of Problem 2 we can present is
given in the following Proposition.
16Proposition 4 U (k) is strictly increasing and continuous in k. In the region where U (k) =
W (k) or U (k) = V (k) the value function U (k) is strictly concave and di￿erentiable almost
everywhere.
There is no discontinuity of U (k) in k at any capital level.22 The agent need not be
provided a large initial trade volume to be credible enough in international exchange and
jump-start trade.
Figure 6 traces a theoretically possible value function of the general problem. W (k)
and V (k) are continuous, di￿erentiable almost everywhere and strictly concave. The value
function of the constrained problem, U (k), generally does not have these properties. Di￿er-
entiability may fail at two points ka and kc apart from the capital per capita level at which
the agents cease investment. At the level of capital ka the agent in the economy is indi￿erent
between remaining in autarky and decumulating capital to the steady state level of capital
per capita k￿ and starting to trade with the outside world and moving to k￿￿￿. At kc we have
U(kc;z￿) = V (kc) and the agents can trade the optimal amount when k ￿ kc but are con-
strained if k < kc. However, if k￿￿ < k￿￿￿ then we can have W (k) ￿ U (k) < V (k); 8k > 0
so that kc does not exist. Concavity of the value function U (k) depends on how bene￿ts to
international trade are structured. If large bene￿ts appear only for capital levels close to the
free trade steady state, then the value function can be convex on the constrained region. All
this depends on the behavior of the sequence of constraints. Figure 7 depicts the growth rates
of an economy corresponding to the value functions shown in Figure 6. The patterns shown
in Figures 6{7 are of course not the only ones that may occur. We can also have for example
a case in which W (k) < U (k) < V (k) and where a single steady state with trade exists.
We can partially characterize the optimal policy function.
Lemma 5 An optimal policy function entails
a)(Ix (kt) > 0 and Iy (kt) = 0) , (u0 (cx (kt)) > u0 (cy (kt)));
b)(Ix (kt) > 0 and Iy (kt) > 0) , (u0 (cx (kt)) = u0 (cy (kt)));
c)(Ix (kt) = 0 and Iy (kt) > 0) , (u0 (cx (kt)) < u0 (cy (kt))):
If agents are constrained so that little trade is feasible relative to the ￿rst-best world, they
will consume the importable. As the level of trade that is available increases, the agent invests
only from the imported good. If two steady states exist, then for capital values greater than
ka the agents invest out of the home good until trade is large enough so that the marginal
utilities of consumption from both goods are equalized.
3.6 Steady state characterization
It is interesting to investigate how many steady states the analyzed system can have for
a given p and ￿. A nontrivial steady state always exists in Problem 2. Proposition 5 answers
in part the question when the autarkic steady state is a steady state of Problem 2.
Proposition 5 If the autarky steady state exists in Problem 2 then
u0 (cx￿) > ￿pu0 (0) (14)
where cx￿ is the autarky steady state consumption of the home good.
The intuition behind this result is that at the autarky steady state capital per capita value
the added utility introduced by the consumption of the foreign good must be small.23 This
22The feasible trade volume for each k need not, however, be convex-valued.
23This condition also means that there is no pro￿table stationary deviation from the autarkic steady state
capital level in which the investment level remains constant but consumption of the importable is increased
by " > 0 in all future periods at the expense of the home consumption.
17can be a result of a high discount factor (low ￿), which means that the reputational penalty
is weak (the present discounted value of foregone utility is low). Adverse terms of trade
(low p) hinder the attractiveness of foreign exchange. The price e￿ect could be reinforced by
traditional "iceberg" transaction costs or trade barriers. A home bias in consumption may be
a cause of a low marginal utility of the foreign good relative to the steady state value of the
home good. When we ￿ip the sign of the inequality, we can also view this as a folk-theorem
condition that is needed to be ful￿lled for trade to be positive at the autarkic k￿ level of
capital per capita.
We can obtain only the necessary condition through the Lagrange multiplier method for the
existence of the autarky steady state in the constrained problem. Su￿ciency does not follow
because the problem that we analyze is nonconcave. It will be clear by Lemma 7 that there
exist values of ￿ for which the autarky steady state is the unique steady state. Proposition 5
also gives a su￿cient condition for a steady state with trade to exist. We cannot, however,
provide sharper conditions on the existence of both types of steady states: the default option is
too complicated to handle analytically. But we show the possibility that multiple steady states
arise (an autarkic and a one in which trade occurs) through simulations reported in Section
3.9 below. Agents with di￿erent initial endowments of k can ￿nd themselves converging to
di￿erent steady state levels. There might thus exist a pseudo-poverty trap: if the necessary
conditions implied by inequality (14) hold, one can show through direct calculations that the
capital level k￿￿￿ corresponding to the ￿rst best Problem 1a could be achieved by the agent
in autarky through capital accumulation and investment out of the home good, but it is not
optimal for her to do so. The nonconvexities created by the incentive constraints may work
in the model like a nonconvexity in technology analyzed in the poverty trap literature causing
poverty traps to occur.
Suppose that there is a steady state with trade k￿￿ and that trade is constrained at that
steady state. Lemma 6 characterizes where the capital per capita associated with that steady
state lies.
Lemma 6 Suppose that z (k￿￿) > 0 at a steady state capital per capita level k￿￿. Then
k￿ < k￿￿ < k￿￿￿.
The incentive constraint on trade causes the importable used as an investment good to be
harder to obtain comparing with the ￿rst-best case. To trade the same amount as in the ￿rst
best the agent needs to have more capital at hand. This causes impediments to investment
to arise. The steady state capital levels if the constraints are binding are therefore lower
than the ￿rst-best steady state capital level. The interesting feature of the result lies in the
fact that one of the steady states of the system { the one with capital per capita at k￿￿ may
depend on the existence of the trading constraints. At the steady state with positive trade it
must be the case that the agent conducts investment out of the importable.
We arrive at a su￿ciency condition for the autarky steady state to exist. Unfortunately
we know that then it is the unique steady state of the economy. We cannot pin down the value
of the discount factor for which the su￿ciency result holds so that we could check whether
the inequality (14) is satis￿ed.
Lemma 7 9￿ > 0 that a steady state with trade does not exist in Problem 2 but it does in
Problem 1.
This means that if the agent is impatient enough she would default on any trade volume.
With a discount rate high enough there is no trade at all at any capital per capita level.
3.7 Extensions
So far we have developed the model assuming that there is no contract enforcement in
international trade. In practice domestic courts might enforce international contracts if foreign
18counterparties sue. Here we brie￿y extend the model to capture this. We model the level of
domestic contract enforcement as an exogenous parameter q that denotes the probability of the
contract being enforced (i.e. the payment exercised) before the consumption-savings decision
if the agent attempts a default. After an unsuccessful default the agent is still punished and
is con￿ned to autarky forever on. The sequential formulation of Problem D in eq. (10) is
modi￿ed to
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where kt+1 (q) and I
y;d
t (q) are the choices made by the agent while attempting a default and
being forced to repay on his imports.
It is trivial to show that the value function D(k;z;q) of this modi￿ed problem exists.
We have D(k;z;q) < D(k;z;0) = D(k;z);8q 2 (0;1]. The value of the outside option for
the agent falls as q increases not only because it is more risky to default but also because
the expected gain is lower. Therefore ￿ z (k) increases as q does but for an agent for which
z￿ (k) ￿ ￿ z (k) there is no e￿ect on the chosen trade volume. The value of Problem 2 with
this modi￿ed function increases as q rises whenever W (k) < U (k) < V (k). This change
might be discontinuous with an in￿nitesimal change in q. One can show a modi￿ed version
of inequality (14) that can hold so that there exist parameter values when there is no trade
in autarky for a level of q < 1.
How do changes in future trade constraints stemming from di￿erent factors than those
discussed above a￿ect current trade constraints? Consider that in the following period the
feasible trade volume ￿ z0 is exogenously given and that from then on the trading constraints
are endogenously determined. If ￿ z0 (k) is uniformly lower than ￿ z (k) then the value of the
problem U (k;z) falls if current trade volume z 2 (0;z￿ (k)) but D(k;z) remains unchanged.
Hence an anticipated increase in the constraints in the future for an economy decreases the
current volume of constrained trade as well. On the other hand, a credible promise to ease
the constraints in the future may cause a lock-in e￿ect and start/increase exchange in earlier
periods. This might work for example in the Turkey-EU relationship. Solely a credible promise
of Turkey joining the EU may ease the hypothetical constraints faced by Turkish traders in
international trade.
A ￿xed cost of international trade participation that would be borne in each period lowers
the bene￿t from trade relatively to the default option D(k;z) for all k and z values. Therefore
a ￿xed cost in trade would exacerbate the analyzed contracting problem.
3.8 An excursion into general equilibrium
In this section we extend our basic model to show that our results hold in a general
equilibrium formulation. Of course this is just one of the many ways one could attempt such
an extension. Suppose there are 3 countries labeled h;i;j producing each a di￿erentiated
good xm;m = h;i;j using their home capital stocks km. The period utility function of each
agent in country m is








and the investment function is








19where a > 1 denotes that the technology of investment out of the foreign goods yields more
units of capital than that out of the home goods. From the perspective of a country, all
foreign goods are perfect substitutes in consumption and investment.
The countries h and i have the same capital endowment k￿￿￿. One can think that they can
have a high level of q, contract enforcement in trade between themselves, which permitted the
achievement of such a high capital stock in the past. These two countries in the absence of the
third trade and their growth path is that of a small open economy as in Problem 1 in a ￿rst-
best world. Investment is always conducted out of the foreign good. The equilibrium price is
ph=pi = 1. The volume of trade at the open economy steady state is 2z = f (k￿￿￿) + ￿k￿￿￿.
Let us now add the third country j with an endowment kj < k￿￿￿. We have that ph=pj = 1
irrespective of kj. By the balanced trade assumption the net demand for foreign goods coming
from this country is zero. We can analyze the growth path of the economy of country j as if it
were in isolation.24 The di￿erence with our initial assumptions in Section 2 is that although
ph=pj = 1, the foreign goods are preferred over the home good as investment goods. The
condition embodied in inequality (14) may hold. The volume of trade zhj+zjh = zij+zji = zj.
All results from Sections 3.1{3.7 carry through.
This shows that countries with high contract enforcement or high capital per capita (in
the presence of multiple steady states) can trade with each other, while the ones with the
contracting problem in international trade may not bene￿t from the conditions in the world
markets and remain con￿ned to autarky. This is consistent with the view that some researchers
have that there might be a "twin peaks" distribution of countries in terms of income and that
convergence clubs might exist (see for example Quah (1996)).
3.9 Simulations
3.9.1 Multiplicity of steady states
We present the results of value function iterations yielding multiple steady states of our
Ramsey economy in Figure 8. The speci￿cation of the utility functions and the parameters in
this exercise is u(c) = ln(c + 1);￿ = 0:55;p = 1:3;￿ = 0:25;￿ = 0:9. The parameter ￿ = 0:55
might seem to be low; one should note that the penalty that we impose to obtain analytical
characterization { total market exclusion in case of default { is the harshest available to the
principal. With milder penalties, the obtained e￿ects would hold for higher values of ￿ (see
Section 3.9.3 below). The price assumed for the home good internationally p = 1:3 could be
also set lower to obtain a similar e￿ect. In this example, as the price approaches unity, there
is only one autarkic steady state and there is no trade. The parameter ￿ = 0:9 is set to the
value taken from the convergence literature that assumes k to be a broad measure of capital
per capita.
In the example that we provide two steady states exist, with capital per capita k￿ and k￿￿
respectively. At k￿ and on the convergence path to k￿ there is no trade. After a threshold
at ka level, trade is positive and the system converges to k￿￿. The agents choose therefore
the path of convergence depending on where their initial k lies. With the utility speci￿cation
that we used the incentive to trade measured as a fraction of trade volume/GDP is larger in
the ￿rst-best world the lower the capital per capita is. With the assumed parameter values
we obtain an overturning of this monotonic relationship between trade/GDP and income per
capita (see also the comparison to the iceberg trade costs in Section 3.9.4). It is clear that
with a positive unanticipated shock to capital an economy that is for example in autarky can
24With di￿erently speci￿ed utility functions we can obtain price changes as the small open economy grows.
As long as the Inada conditions on the consumption and investment demand of the developed countries do
not hold and separability is assumed the prices that would be obtained internationally by country j products
are bounded. We still have the possibility of multiple steady states (multiple prices can clear markets) if the
price is too low. Then we could obtain country j that would remain in a poverty trap even though there would
be world demand for its products at relative prices of country j products exceeding one.
20become credible enough to start trading with the outside world and ￿nd itself on a di￿erent
trajectory. On the other hand, a series of negative unanticipated shocks to capital can force
a trading economy into autarky.
3.9.2 Comparative statics
We perform comparative statics on export volume/production ratios to observe the e￿ects
of parameter changes in our model on allocations. The openness measure is 1/2 of the total
trade volume/production due to the balanced trade assumption.
In Figures 9{12 odd-numbered panels depict simulations of export volume/GDP ratios
vs. capital for the ￿rst-best problem. Even-numbered panels show the e￿ects of the incentive
problem for the same parameters as in the corresponding panel. We discuss comparative
statics exercises for two base cases. The ￿rst is the example from Section 3.9.1 (depicted in
Figures 9 and 10) where multiple steady states are present. The base parameters in this case
that were used for comparison were u(c) = ln(c+1), ￿ = 0:55, ￿ = 0:25, p = 1:3 and ￿ = 0:9.
In Figures 11 and 12 we present results where in the base scenario trade is positive for all
capital per capita values, but constraints are present at low income values. The underlying
parameters used in this exercise were u(c) = ln(c + 1), ￿ = 0:6, ￿ = 0:2, p = 1:3 and ￿ = 0:8
unless otherwise indicated.
In all even-numbered panels we observe that the model with the friction can deliver many
di￿erent patterns of openness as a function of capital, depending on the parameter values.
This is in contrast with the ￿rst-best world where the trade volume to GDP ratio decreases
monotonically with the increase of capital per capita. There initially the exports/GDP mea-
sure is one because of the agent’s desire to quickly accumulate capital (the Inada condition
on utility is broken). It is interesting to note that if the agents are constrained in the level
of optimal trade then they are so for low levels of capital. As the constraints are eased, after
some threshold the optimal ￿rst-best level of trade/GDP might be chosen. For the values of
capital where constraints bind, growth of the economy is lower than in the ￿rst-best case.25
Our model can therefore produce the same correlations that we observe in the data: countries
with higher incomes are on average also the ones that are more open.26
In panel 1 the ￿rst-best export volume/production ratio is presented. A more linear
utility function of the agent leads to a higher share of international trade in consumption and
investment demand: it is more pro￿table to substitute home for foreign goods. In panel 2 the
e￿ects of limited commitment are present. The more concave the agent’s utility function is,
the easier it is to sustain trade. The friction makes the largest impact on trade volume for
utility functions where substitutability of the home and foreign goods is high and the demand
is very sensitive to price changes.
An improvement in the terms of trade increase trade volume/GDP ratios (panels 3{4).
An increase in the depreciation rate of capital has little e￿ect on the export volume/GDP
ratio in the ￿rst-best world, although it may have strong implications in the world with
limited commitment in trade. A high depreciation rate decreases the value of trading relative
to autarky: at the steady state the investment in capital (that is preferably ￿nanced through
imports) increases relative to low depreciation values.
In panels 7 and 8 the e￿ects of the discount factors on export volume are shown: the
harshness of the penalties for default is lower when individuals are very impatient and the
corresponding export volumes are also lower. The simulations in the two panels of Figure 12
assumed ￿ = 0:35.
25We obtain qualitatively similar results when we use component utility functions of the exponential class
u(c) = ￿￿ exp(￿￿c) + a, where a is a constant.
26If we introduce a more realistic setup, for example with bounded, additive i.i.d. shocks to capital at
any capital per capita level that would occur between the shipment of the goods by the principal and their
arrival, we can also have an easy explanation of the correlation between creditworthiness and capital per
capita. Higher-income countries would be more credible, since their default would be less likely.
21The e￿ects of changes in capital intensity of the production function on openness are
shown in panels 9 and 10. An increase in the capital intensity allows the constraint on trade
to be weaker for lower values of capital. The value of international participation is higher with
more capital intensive technology and lower rewards to labor, since the accumulation of the
productive factor is cheaper by using importables. The deviation from the autarkic steady
state to consume a small amount of the importable is more attractive, since the consumption
of the agents at the steady state is larger as well. An increase in the parameter ￿ leads the
ratio k
￿￿￿
k￿ to increase { the autarkic and the ￿rst-best world steady states of trade are further
apart. A high ￿ allows the multiplicity of steady states to exist; otherwise the steady states
are "too close" and there is only one steady state with autarky or trade.
Panels 11 and 12 present changes in q, the enforcement parameter. In the ￿rst best world
the change in this parameter does not change the volume of trade (we implicitly assumed
that improvement of enforcement does not cost any resources). In the problem with the
contracting friction, an increase in q raises the exports/GDP ratio if the agent is initially
constrained but imports are positive. A small increase of q from zero does not lead always
to the disappearance of the no trade region. In fact, there is a range of low levels of contract
enforcement where the autarkic steady state is still present. The result that multiple steady
states are present in our system holds on an open set of values of q in the neighborhood of
zero. Hence, small increases in the enforcement of international contracts may not let an
agent out of autarky.
3.9.3 Weaker punishments
We investigated allocations that arise when the punishment that is available to the princi-
pal involves only a one-period con￿nement to autarky. A weaker penalty of this sort in both
aforementioned speci￿cations produces only autarkic allocations. We obtain autarky as a re-
sult for discount factors as high as ￿ = 0:9 and other parameter values set to u(c) = ln(c+1),
￿ = 0:25, p = 1:2 and ￿ = 0:8. The curse of dimensionality and the need to recalculate the
default option in its entirety after each value function iteration precludes us from giving a
more detailed account of economies with trade and a one-period forgiving trigger punishment
strategy. What we learn from our exercise, however, is that for any initially given set of
parameters the introduction of this penalty scheme delivers lower incentives for the agents to
perform and hence also lowers the achievable trade volume when trade is already constrained.
3.9.4 Trade costs
In Figure 13 we show how the imperfection in trade a￿ects trade volumes di￿erently from
the Samuelsonian trade costs in the speci￿cation undertaken in Section 3.9.1. If trade costs
are large (￿ = 0:2), the foreign good is not used for investment and the economy tends to
the autarky steady state. Trade exists at that steady state but only for the love-of-variety
reasons. With smaller trade costs (￿ = 0:1) the importable is used both for investment and
consumption.27 All this clearly depends on whether the price of the importable with trade
costs imposed falls below p = 1 or not. In our problem with contracting frictions, the volume
of trade is zero on the range of k where the economy remains in autarky. After the threshold
ka is reached trade volume increases sharply to later slowly converge towards the optimal free
trade value.
The existence of Samuelsonian trade costs can emulate some patterns of trade achieved
by our model, but only the export/GDP ratios monotonic in capital per capita. The friction
we study allows for the existence of two steady states with the level of iceberg trade costs
held constant as capital per capita is changed. Iceberg trade costs directly a￿ect, however,
27Trade costs in the range of ￿ 2 [0:1;0:2] are used inter alia in the simulation exercises of Obstfeld and
Rogo￿ (2000).
22the incentives of the agents to trade by lowering the gains from trade. This can be seen in
inequality (14): the existence of (high) trade costs can push the economy into the no-trade
region by also exacerbating the contracting friction.
3.10 Policy implications
We derive the policy implications that can solve at least partially the contracting problem
that we discuss both from our theoretical results and from simulations.
In order to raise the attractiveness of international trade to the agent the central govern-
ment should liberalize trade. We can see this when we associate trade barriers with imposed
trade costs and use the intuition from inequality (14). With lower trade barriers, agents
will observe higher bene￿ts of international exchange and therefore become more credible to
outside counterparties. We also note that the central government may slow down or stall the
growth of the economy by placing high trade barriers. In a severe case, it may even cause a
downturn and condemn the economy to eternal poverty (in the model). This can be possible if
the stock of capital per capita falls below the level where the agent would decumulate capital
even if there were no trade barriers. At this point we should also note the negative role of
large trading blocks exerting market power in trade (for example in agriculture) that lowers
the attractiveness of international exchange for agriculture exporters that in the view of our
model may deny low-income countries market access and stall at the same time their growth.
Trade agreements in which small, low-income economies liberalize trade more than large high-
income countries may be bene￿cial for the former ones through the indirect positive e￿ect of
the incentives on the consumption surplus derived from trade and on their growth. Entering
preferential trade agreements by a low-income country with one high-income country (for
example the ex-colonizer) may be motivated aside from other considerations by the argument
to jump-start growth by making the exchange with a high-income economy more attractive
for traders from both countries and hence allowing investment imports to proceed. In a sense,
a preferential trade agreement can be a device that lowers the commitment problems that
individual agents may face.
A central planner that could improve domestic enforceability of international contracts and
punish home defaulters would be able to increase the volume of trade if it were constrained.
This should be stressed, for the ability to enforce international contracts domestically can
eradicate the problem altogether. Improving the enforceability of contracts, however, may
take time. Uni￿cation of exchange procedures and an improvement of international contract-
ing helped to overcome some trade impediments. As examples we can name the Zollverein in
XIXth century Germany or the European Union today. NAFTA and its Chapter 11 are a case
of a trade agreement with a provision to protect foreign counterparties. Nevertheless, national
sovereignty might prevent full enforceability from being achieved: fairness of the domestic au-
thorities adjudicating claims in international disputes must in the end be self-enforcing. We
also note that trade liberalization may not be enough to induce outside world traders to start
trading with the domestic agents and that stronger contract enforcement would be required
to allow for international exchange.
A benevolent central planner with the ability to tax in this limited commitment economy
can improve allocations by easing agents’ incentive compatibility constraints. Enhancing
capital accumulation could give the incentives to acquire enough capital so as to start trading
with the outside world. Any policy that raises the attractiveness of home products so that
they command a higher world price or lowers trade costs also helps to provide incentives to
agents to perform in contracts.
Agents from the outside world may also help in overcoming the obstacles in international
exchange of low-income countries. There is a role for high income country export credit
agencies. If the length of trade credit is extended, more trade might occur as the agents
might be more credible to repay at a future date. We can also stress the usefulness of IMF
23stand-by loans in times of external ￿nancial distress. If hard currency is di￿cult to obtain,
counterparties from a country facing currency problems may default even involuntarily and
break valuable ongoing trade relationships, therefore exacerbating the negative e￿ects of a
hypothetical crisis situation.28 Multinational companies may overcome payment problems by
inducing trade through subsidiaries. Foreign direct investment might be especially important
for low-income countries that face constraints on international contracts (see Albuquerque
(2003) for a model).
We should not forget that this discussion assumes that there are no other strategic con-
siderations for the central planners of the countries in question. Note that small changes in
policy can cause discontinuous e￿ects on trade volume. Finally, policies that can ease the
constraints on trade in the future (for example a credible trade liberalization announcement)
and raise the utility obtained through trading today will also ease the constraints on trade
that might be in place.
4 Correlations in the data
4.1 Testable implications
The model does not allow us to make predictions regarding trade openness (de￿ned as
volume of trade/production) unless we are able to account for all of the relevant parameters.
If the friction in international trade that we analyzed works, we have shown in Section 3.9.2
that it can account for a vast array of correlations between capital and openness. The model
predicts that the relationship between the current ratio of exports/capita and production per































t denotes the indicator variable of whether the country is constrained, Id
t denotes the
indicator variable of whether the country defaulted in the past, ￿ zt (￿) and z￿
t (￿) are functions
of constrained and unconstrained trade volumes respectively, pt are the terms of trade, kt {
capital per capita level (we could use income per capita), ￿ { the discount factor, ￿
p
t { trade
costs stemming from policy (tari￿s etc.), ￿t
t { other trade costs (distance, language, existence
of container ports etc.), qt { contract enforcement level between borders. The variable bt
denotes trade credit terms that limit the scope of trade. These could be thought of as speci￿c
limits (in case of centrally planned economies), exchange arrangements or trade credit contract
terms.
There are obvious problems with verifying this equation empirically. We do not know
what is "the true", unconstrained volume of trade on the growth path towards a steady state
(if one exists). We also know that there are no countries that do not engage in exchange
with the outside world and that generally the trade balances are nonzero. Many parameters
(for example the discount rate or capital intensity) cannot be measured or may be estimated
incorrectly. Our simulations indicate that even small changes in the underlying parameters
may radically change the shape of the openness ratio. Other di￿culties make the problem
harder. The punishments for lack of payment of single agents do not shut o￿ the trade of
other traders from the same country. Even if we associate defaulting on trade with sovereign
defaults, the observed punishments do not involve complete denial of trade with the defaulter.
In estimating our model a problem arises that the volume of trade in any given period might
28See Stephens (1998) on the role of export-credit agencies in the East Asian crisis and the policy conclusions
he reaches.
24depend on the whole future path of trade in the case of constrained economies. Hence we
cannot test this equation directly and investigate whether the model is true or not. Therefore
we can only provide evidence that supports the model by looking at the in￿uence of contract
enforcement on trade volume.
From our framework we can conclude that contract enforcement should be an important
trade volume determinant if our story is true. Credit terms on trade ￿ows should be also taken
into account since these take into consideration expectations of future performance. We test
these presumptions in a gravity model framework to verify the robustness of the correlations
presented in Figures 3 and 4. Trade between two countries i and j relative to their two GDPs













where popit;popjt denote populations of the two countries. We need to control for the standard
elements in a gravity equation. We are interested in the terms qijt and bijt that could include
the quality of contract enforcement, credit terms, risk ratings, etc. In the data we could
gather we do not have direct data on qijt or many choices for bijt. We use average maximum
tenors (durations) that are granted on credit for long-term trade contracts in the practice of
forfaiting. 29 We choose this variable because it accounts for a feature of true trade credit
contracts o￿ered by the market and it pertains to deals of private concern. It inherently
involves a measure of future creditworthiness and an assessment of collection risk. Moreover,
it may capture the interplay between institution e￿ectiveness (especially that of the banking
system) and contract enforcement.30 Therefore, it is our prime choice over other institutional
measures that might be available.






= ￿1 ln(Teni) + ￿2 ln(Tenj) + ￿3 ln(Yit) + ￿4 ln(Yjt) (20)
+￿5 ln(Yit=Popit) + ￿6 ln(Yjt=Popjt) + ￿7 (Dij) + ￿8T + "ijt
where Xijt denotes imports from countries j to i at time t, Y is real GDP, Pop is population,
Ten are average maximum tenors, P is the terms of trade and Dij is the set of geographic
and qualitative variables characterizing each dyad such as distance, common language, conti-
guity, trade agreements, tari￿s, landlockedness or being an island, colonial past, area and the
distance from the equator. The vector T denotes time-speci￿c dummies.
4.1.1 Data
We use data from the years 2001{2003 because of the availability of data on credit for
trade { average maximum tenors on forfaiting contracts. The tenors for countries are taken
from listings in Trade Finance, an industry journal. They indicate the maximum duration
(up to 7 years) of the bills originating from trade contracts guaranteed by importer country
banks that money-center banks are willing to discount. The averages from the quotations
of 5 individual money center banks were taken out. The drawback of the data is that not
all banks quote all countries at all times. This re￿ects their specialization or lack of quotes
due to a zero rating. For example Vietnam is quoted only by 3 banks over the time period
in the sample and Argentina and Zimbabwe, present in the listings for 2001, are missing in
subsequent years. In the end we use data for countries that had their ratings between 0 and
7 years (maximum in the data set). This is because data on many countries, especially those
29For a de￿nition of forfaiting, see Section A.1.
30Literally the data account for the willingness of money-center banks to discount bills originating from
trade transactions that are guaranteed by the importer’s domestic bank.
25with poor credit, is missing and several countries are receiving maximum possible tenors.
We do not know, however, what are the maximum tenors that the banks would be willing
to provide for these countries above 7 years. In e￿ect this excludes high-income and small
countries from our data.
Data on bilateral trade come from the IMF DOTS database. Import and export volumes
were de￿ated using US CPI and averaged to create total trade volumes between countries.
Population, GDP, GDP per capita in PPP terms, CPI, GDP de￿ator, budget balance and CA
series were obtained from the World Bank WDI database. From the CEPII we obtained data
on geographical variables (distance between countries, contiguity, latitude, area, landlocked-
ness, islands), languages and country allegiance. Data for FTAs and applied simple average
MFN tari￿s were obtained from the WTO website. Country credit ratings are taken from
Institutional Investor. Whenever possible we supplemented the missing data with Economist
Intelligence Unit ￿gures. The resulting dataset consisted of 3725 dyads over 3 years (11175
observations). Countries included in the study are listed in the Appendix, Section A.4.31
Variable codes are given in Table 1.
4.1.2 Results
We summarize our results in Table 2.
In Column 1 we show the between regression estimates of the logarithm of the ratio of
imports from country j to i and GDP per capita of countries i and j. The log of tenors of
the importer country (lnTeni) is signi￿cant at the 10% level. A 1% change in the minimum
tenor in the dyad leads on average to an increase of the normalized trade volume by 0.15%.
Surprisingly, the same measure for exporting country does not matter in the volume of trade
(lnTenj). In our regression we ￿nd that countries with higher income per capita trade more
(variables lnYi=Popi and lnYj=Popj). The size of the domestic market matters for trade:
exporters (resp. importers) with larger GDP (variables lnYj and lnYi) trade more (resp.
less). A larger area of the importer country (lnAreai) has a negative e￿ect on the volume of
exchange.
In our sample trade volume in dyads with a larger number islands (IslandNumij) is
higher. The remaining variables geographical variables show the expected signs. Two coun-
tries with a common colonizer (ComColij), o￿cial and ethnic languages (Com Lang Offij
and Com Lang Ethij respectively) enjoy higher trade volumes. Contiguity (Contigij) and
common FTA membership (FTAij) raises mutual trade. The logarithm of the level of average
applied simple MFN tari￿s (lnMFNiMFNj) enters strongly into the regression. The loga-
rithm of distance (lnDistij) and a larger number of landlocked countries (LandlockNumij)
in the dyad tend to lower trade volumes. A larger logarithm of distances from the equator
(lnLatiLatj) and past allegiance to a common country (SameCtryij) also strengthens trade
links. The dummies for being a colonized country in 1945 and the dummy indicating a colo-
nial link between two countries do not enter signi￿cantly into the regression. The inclusion
of a measure of terms of trade (the ratio of CPI prices to the GDP de￿ator) does not enter
signi￿cantly into the regressions and restricts severely the set of available pairs for estimation.
The coe￿cients on these three variables are not shown.
In the ￿xed e￿ects regression with dummies included for each dyad (Column 3) the inclu-
sion of the log of tenors of the importer is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. The point
estimate of the e￿ect of importer tenors is very close to that from the between regression
(0.157). It is important that our measure comes statistically signi￿cant in this regression be-
cause the inclusion of dummies can capture a lot of speci￿c information that is not controlled
for in the between regression (for example the di￿erences in the tari￿s on speci￿c classes of
products).
31A detailed description of the data is available from the author.
264.1.3 Simultaneity and the robustness of results
Our data may su￿er from simultaneity bias. The average maximum tenors that we use
and overall country trade/GDP volume can be driven by some third variable. We therefore
instrument for the tenors using one-period lagged budget balance, CPI, real interest rate,
GDP growth and Institutional Investor credit ratings. We also use the constructed legal
origins variables from the paper of Djankov et al. (2005). We note that we have excluded
from the regressions most colonizing countries (except for Japan and Australia). We lose
observations due to lack of some macroeconomic data and on legal origins in the end being
restricted to 9252 observations.
In Column 2 we present the resulting IV regression. The instrumented variable estimate
of the log of tenors is signi￿cant at the 1% level and its point estimate is more than two and
a half times larger than the between one. We also achieve a higher, though not signi￿cant
e￿ect on the log of exporter tenors. Interestingly, these results are close to the ones that we
￿nd while bootstrapping the original between regression one thousand times taking draws of
2000 out of our 3725 groups included in the original estimation.
We also provide another set of estimates where instead of tenors we use credit ratings
provided semi-annually by Institutional Investor (variables lnIIi and lnIIj) that con￿rm our
basic ￿ndings (Column 4). The Institutional Investor credit ratings do not directly pertain to
trade contracts, however. They may still be interpreted as capturing indirectly the credibility
of the banking system and the safety of the payment channel for international transactions.
4.2 Discussion
The estimation results support our model regarding the contract enforcement measure,
however we do not want to overinterpret them. The variable that takes into consideration
future performance of the economy and the probability of credit repayment { average max-
imum tenors { enters signi￿cantly into the regressions, pointing to the importance of credit
standing for trade volume. Shorter maturities of bank-guaranteed transactions hurt trade.
We do not know due to the lack of suitable data, however, what is the correlation of the
willingness to ￿nance long-term contracts with the willingness to o￿er short-term ones. We
might conjecture that they could commove together. Stephens (1998) provides evidence that
between 1997 and 1998 the short-term exposure of export credit agencies in Southeast Asian
economies fell by 40% whereas the medium to long-run one only by 12%. We also note that
the results that we obtain may be of relevance for growth because the medium to long-term
trade that is ￿nanced by forfaiting often involves investment goods.
4.3 Other evidence and empirical strategies
Some existing studies provide indirect evidence that could be interpreted in the favor of the
model. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) ￿nd that survey measures of contract enforcement
enter signi￿cantly into gravity equations and suggest a competing explanation for the stylized
fact that high-income countries trade disproportionately with each other. The work of Rose
(2004) ￿nds that bilateral trade between countries is impaired after one of the countries
reneges on its debt vis-￿ a-vis the counterparty. The channel through which the default a￿ects
the country is not disentangled, however. Interestingly, while testing the robustness of his
results Rose ￿nds that the rating that a country receives in the Institutional Investor magazine
capturing its perceived riskiness is also a signi￿cant variable in the gravity equations.
One could also perform case studies of countries that liberalize trade. According to the
model, countries with higher incomes in PPP per capita terms, better contract enforcement
and the ability to form long-run relationships would experience faster imports growth.32
32The di￿culties and traps of similar studies are shown in Wacziarg and Welch (2003).
27We could also look at countries that merge (for example East and West Germany) and
divide (former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia and East Timor) and
analyze the trade patterns between them after the change.33 The model would predict a
larger fall in exchange between poorer former members of a union than richer ones.
5 Conclusions
Border-in￿icted contractual impediments may severely hinder the volume of international
exchange, especially for low-income economies. This in e￿ect can depress the growth of small,
open economies if investment goods are primarily obtained from abroad. In an extreme case,
the inability to properly contract in international trade may lead an economy to a poverty
trap and close the channel through which trade may a￿ect growth { by raising investment
rates. The achievable steady states per capita with trade can, however, also be dependent on
the existence of the constraints. The ability to access foreign markets by small open economies
may increase as capital is accumulated, as international exchange becomes more valuable and
economies more interdependent. This model gives another answer to the question posed by
Lucas (1990) why capital { here in the form of trade { does not ￿ow to poorer countries. We
also overcome the result of Marcet and Marimon (1992) showing how in the presence of limited
commitment on international transactions international exchange exists on the transition path
towards an open-economy steady state with trade.
Our model can provide an alternative account of the positive relationship between income
and trade/GDP that exists in the data. We also support both theoretically and empirically
the ￿nding of Anderson and Marcouiller (2003) that contractual impediments on interna-
tional transactions lower international trade. As a policy measure, therefore, we stress the
importance of strengthening international contract enforcement and removing trade barriers
so that a developing economy can bene￿t from international trade and achieve higher cap-
ital per capita in the long run. For empirical studies of international trade, our work calls
for including in estimations, if available, measures of institutions connected with transaction
processing and enforcement.
It would be interesting to extend this model of deterministic trade volume and input
a full-blown trade model so that we could study how trade patterns may be a￿ected by
contractual problems in international transactions. We would like to study the following
phenomena. Trade in di￿erentiated goods often involves and requires long-term relationships
whereas trade in homogenous products is more borne out to competition (see a study by Rauch
(1999)). Di￿erentiated products often have informational content incorporated in them and
the buyer may not readily verify the quality of a good. Again this creates an ex-post moral
hazard on the part of the seller as in our original model. To restore trade this would require
a mechanism for providing incentives for the seller not to cheat on the quality of a product
and reputation34 could be used of the sort we included in the framework presented in this
paper. We could use a dynamic version of the model of Davis (1995) to explore from the
contract enforcement point of view whether low-income countries with poor institutions may
face barriers in intra-industry trade which would cause them to specialize in a homogenous
good, creating a potential poverty trap.
In further work it would be exciting to analyze the dynamics of the current account and
break with the assumption of balanced trade to revisit puzzles analyzed by Obstfeld and
33A study looking at trade ￿ows after disintegrations was conducted by Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2000).
These authors ￿nd that after disintegration of countries in 1990s trade volume falls relative to the earlier
domestic level of exchange, but in 1998 the disintegrated countries still traded between each other from 2 to
30 times more than the volume of "normal" trade estimated from gravity equations for the rest of the world.
34The quality assurance literature (see Klein and Le￿er (1981) and Shapiro (1983)) analyzed similar issues.
Klein and Le￿er (1981) suggest the need for monopoly pro￿ts as a way of sustaining quality. A model of in-
ternational trade with monopolists that improve on allocations in the presence of limited contract enforcement
is studied by Michalski (2004).
28Rogo￿ (2000). This would allow us to study the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle from the viewpoint
of a contract enforcement model and possibly improve on earlier analyses in a growth economy
as for example that presented in Marcet and Marimon (1992).
We believe that this framework can be also extended to study structural change and growth
following Galor and Weil (2000), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Kongsamut et al. (2001) or
Laitner (2000). We can study how a country evolves from an agrarian economy to an indus-
trialized one and an economy that is integrated with the outside world. This would require
a setup of a multisectoral trade model. An initial good productivity shock could provide
a "takeo￿" of growth of these economies in general equilibrium and a start of international
trade.
Finally, it would be important to quantify how much trade volume is a￿ected by the
breakup of international transaction linkages and lower creditworthiness of payment interme-
diaries in and after ￿nancial crises and separate this from other macroeconomic e￿ects that
may drive international trade.
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33A Appendix
A.1 De￿nition of forfaiting
There are many de￿nitions of forfaiting. Let us present the ones that carry the most
common elements.
"Forfaiting: A non-recourse export ￿nancing approach. The ￿nancier purchases bank
avalized notes and carries all risks with no recourse to the exporter." (www.nordea.com)
"Forfaiting without recourse to the exporter: Discount without recourse to the exporter of
letters of credit or drafts accepted by Citibank or other banks (need to be asked for approval).
A type of export ￿nancing in which the funds advanced to the exporter do not a￿ect his credit
line." (www.latam.citibank.com)
Forfaiting allows the exporter to obtain a discounted ￿ow immediately after the transaction
is made at the same time o￿ering a trade credit to the importer. Forfaiting contracts entail
transactions from 90 days up to ten years. Usually the value of the underlying transaction
is in excess of $100,000 and may reach tens of U.S. million dollars worth. The transaction
is usually without recourse, i.e. it does not depend on the underlying trade ￿ow to occur or
not. Traditionally the underlying transaction involved investment goods, but this changed in
the 1990s to include any type of goods. Forfaiting is usually a free-market product o￿ered by
specialized investment banks (compiled after Ripley (1996) and Seyoum (2000)).
A.2 Examples of contract enforcement problems in international
trade
An institutional setup consisting of banks, intermediaries and various contract types was
created to mitigate payment problems in international trade. 35{50% of U.S. and UK trade
is conducted via open account or consignment which constitutes pure trade credit (Seyoum
(2000)). This is most often used through related counterparties. 90% of world trade is done
on cash or short term credit (up to 180 days) basis (Stephens (1998)). The most popular
payment instruments are letters of credit. None of the payment methods guarantees full
security of the transaction either for the exporter or the importer. Often the problem of
international contract enforcement is exacerbated by weak local institutions.
Letters of credit (L/Cs) and other payment documents need not be accepted by correspon-
dent banks, constituting a breach of the contract. This can be due to many factors. About
50% of L/C documents contain discrepancies (see Seyoum (2000)). Trade Finance (2003a)
(an industry journal) documents that Chinese banks were favoring their buyer clients in the
￿rst part of 2003 and unduly rejected at that time letters of credit, preventing delivery of
steel products. The outstanding amount on these transactions at the time of reporting was in
excess of $100 million. The reasons cited for the rejection were falling steel prices: the buyers
wanted to breach this way the already signed contracts with suppliers. Fafchamps (2004, p.59)
notes: "The absence of SGS-like35 inspection for goods leaving Ghana, for instance, makes
it easy for foreign clients to reject goods after delivery and extort discounts from Ghanaian
exporters."
International litigation may be costly, involving many courts and time consuming. Awards
may be unenforceable. Trade Finance (2003b) provides an example. A Swiss trading ￿rm
was involved in a 7 year dispute with a state company from Uzbekistan. Despite being
awarded by several international courts up to $16 million they were unable to seize any
assets belonging to Uzbekistan bar in France for ca. $250,000. Other examples dealing with
international litigation are provided in Nehring (2003) where the rulings of the Brazilian
Supreme Court needed for con￿rmation of international arbitration awards against Brazilian
￿rms are discussed.
35SGS is a Swiss company that specializes in trade certi￿cation worldwide.
34Payment documents also cost. Letters of credit for international transactions o￿ered by
Polish banks typically cost 0.15{0.2% of the contract with each change to the terms with the
bank amounting to another 0.1{0.2% of the value. Such instruments in Africa cost triple the
amount in the US and were reported by local exporters to be too costly to use (p. 73 of Biggs
et al. (1996)). Fafchamps (2004) notes that African banks deliberately use the opportunity
to notify the companies late about the ful￿llment of payments to earn accruing interest on
money in transit. Biggs et al. (1996) provide other examples of the de￿ciencies of the local
banking sectors that hinder international payments.
Export credit agencies promote exports not only through cheap ￿nancing but also by
insuring collection risks to exporters. A description of this is in Trade Finance (1999). An
agreement on payment for US agricultural equipment was to be ￿nanced by Ukrainian exports
proceeds deposited in escrow accounts at banks approved by Ex-Im. In the 5 years proceeding
the agreement, $400 million of ￿nancing was supported by the Ex-Im bank. Private ￿nancial
institutions also play a role. An example is provided in Trade Finance (2001). Standard Bank
London provided the necessary funds to build a fuel terminal to an importer that was granted
by Zanzibar the sole right of fuel taxes collection. Without these provisions, the importer of
fuel would not have the credibility to pay and no deal would take place.
A credit element is often present in cases of imports for investment that will reap returns
over a prolonged time period. Examples of successful deals of this type abound. For example
in the May 2005 issue of Trade Finance we ￿nd description of such deals between companies
respectively from Germany and Armenia (machines for the foil industry), Finland and Russia
(machines for the pulp industry), Japan and Oman (construction of a fertilizer factory) or
U.S. and Brazil (helicopters for oil rigs).
A.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Let C (X) be the space of bounded continuous functions. De￿ne
the operator T : C (X) ! C (X) as
(TV )(k) = sup
k02￿ft(k)
(u(f (k) ￿ z ￿ Ix) + u(pz ￿ Iy)) + ￿V (k0)
Consider ￿rst V (k) and V (e k) both being weakly monotone in k and e k respectively and
k < e k. We want to show (TV )(k) < (TV )(e k). Suppose that ￿rst we keep the same choice of
the next period capital k0 which is the optimal choice under initial capital k. This is feasible,
since ￿ft(k) ￿ ￿ft(e k) and with the higher capital level the agents can replicate the optimal
decisions undertaken at k0. We have
(TV )(k) = sup
k02￿ft(k)
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35To show strict concavity of V (k) observe that we have 8￿ 2 (0;1);k 6= e k
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because of the strict concavity of utility and production functions.
Suppose k0 2 ￿ft(k) and e k0 2 ￿ft(e k):Then ￿k0 + (1 ￿ ￿)e k0 2 ￿ft(￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)e k) for all
￿ 2 (0;1) because the action space is convex. Take a concave function V and show that the
operator T preserves concavity; moreover, under our assumptions, it induces strict concavity.
8￿ 2 (0;1) we have ￿￿V (k0) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿V (e k0) ￿ ￿V (￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)e k0). Now,
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o
= (TV )(￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)e k)
By the Benveniste and Scheinkman result, V (k) is di￿erentiable almost everywhere in the
interior because V (k) is strictly concave and u(￿) is di￿erentiable in k. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2: D(k;z) is strictly increasing in z because u(pzt ￿ I
y
t ) is. Be-
cause all elements of the maximized function are strictly concave in (k;z) (following from
the assumptions on the investment function g (Ix;Iy)) , from the Maximum Theorem under
convexity it follows that D(k;z) is strictly concave in (k;z). Because the constraint set has
a convex graph, there is a unique set of maximizers for each (k;z). From the Benveniste
and Sheinkman result we conclude that D(k;z) is di￿erentiable in (k;z) and speci￿cally that






> 0. This Dz is continuous and di￿erentiable and Dzz < 0. We






(f0 (k) + (1 ￿ ￿)). ￿
Proof of Proposition 3: A direct application of Lemma 2.12 in Rustichini (1998a). ￿
Proof of Lemma 1: The case when ￿ z (k) = 0 is obvious. When ￿ z (k) > 0 and z￿ (k) >
￿ z (k) suppose that ~ z (k) < ￿ z (k) is optimal. Since in the constrained region u0 (cx) < pu0 (cy)
we can increase the current period utility of the agent by increasing trade to ￿ z (k), leaving
36next period choice of k0 intact and boosting the consumption of cy, the importable. Since
p > 1 this dominates the previous choice. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2: We argue by contradiction. Suppose ￿ z (k) > 0 and take k0 > k.
Suppose that U (k; ￿ z) = D(k; ￿ z) but U (k0; ￿ z) < D(k0; ￿ z).
By strict concavity of D we have D(k0; ￿ z) < D(k; ￿ z)+(k0 ￿ k)Dk (k; ￿ z) which is equal to
D(k; ￿ z) + (k0 ￿ k)u0 ￿
cx;d￿
(f0 (k) + (1 ￿ ￿)) where cx;d is the consumption level of the home
good maximizing D(k; ￿ z).
De￿ne ~ U (k0; ￿ z) = U (k; ￿ z) + u
￿




cx;d ￿ ￿ z
￿
.
We have U (k; ￿ z) < ~ U (k0; ￿ z) ￿ U (k0; ￿ z).
First we tackle the case where it would be optimal for the agent to consume zero of the
home goods after default. Then D(k0; ￿ z) < D(k; ￿ z) + (k0 ￿ k)u0 (0)(f0 (k) + (1 ￿ ￿)) while
~ U (k0; ￿ z) = U (k; ￿ z) + u(f (k0) ￿ f (k) + (1 ￿ ￿)(k0 ￿ k)) ￿ u(0) which for small change in k
are equal. If after default there would be consumption of the home good, choose z so that
cx;d ￿ z > 0. By concavity
u(cx ￿ z + f (k0) ￿ f (k) + (1 ￿ ￿)(k0 ￿ k)) ￿ u(cx ￿ z)
￿ u0 (cx ￿ z + f (k0) ￿ f (k) + (1 ￿ ￿)(k0 ￿ k))[f (k0) ￿ f (k) + (1 ￿ ￿)(k0 ￿ k)]
Take " = k0 ￿ k > 0. By concavity of f we have f (k0) ￿ f (k) ￿ f0 (k + ")". For " small
enough we have cx ￿ z + f0 (k + ")" + (1 ￿ ￿)" < cx because z > 0. By continuity of u0 and
f0
u0 (cx ￿ z + f0 (k + ")" + (1 ￿ ￿)")(f0 (k + ") + (1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ u0 (cx)(f0 (k) + (1 ￿ ￿)) > 0
Collecting the terms we notice in the interior that
D(k0; ￿ z) < ~ U (k0; ￿ z) ￿ U (k0; ￿ z)
By the de￿nition of ￿ z, it must be the case that ￿ z (k0) ￿ ￿ z (k) > 0. If the case with no
consumption is outruled, ￿ z (k0) > ￿ z (k). ￿
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose that on the optimal path no trade is prescribed in the
following period and the optimal capital choice is k0. Then U (k0) = D(k0;0) = W (k0).
If z (k) > 0, then the agent can increase her welfare by defaulting today and obtaining the
autarky utility for ever on. Consequently, it must be the case that D(k;z) > U (k) 8 z (k) > 0
at that k. ￿
Proof Lemma 4: Consider the programming problem in Section 3.4. Assume that the
current period is the last period in which ￿ z (k) = 0 and that from the next period ￿ z (k0) > 0.
Then, it must be the case in the current period that U (k) = D(k; ￿ z (k)) = D(k;0) = W (k)
and U (k0) ￿ D(k0;z) > D(k0;0) = W (k0). But, with U (k) = W (k) there exists one path
with no trade, so we contradict uniqueness. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: For the strict monotonicity result, take k < k0. Since A(k) ￿
A(k0) it is possible to select at k0 continuation values that are optimal at k and consume the
remaining resources, increasing instantaneous utility. Hence U (k0) > U (k). For continuity,
we need to ascertain that the correspondence A(U;k) is a compact-valued and continuous
correspondence. The argument follows from Lemma 2.12 of Rustichini (1998a). Compact-
valuedness comes from the fact that the incentive compatible choices of z are in a closed set
de￿ned for each k by fz : U (k;z) ￿ D(k;z)g contained in a compact-valued set of feasible
trade volumes in the ￿rst best problem. Furthermore, the constraints D(k;z) are continuous
in k and therefore A(U;k) is upper-hemicontinuous. The set of feasible sequences is bound by
two continuous functions - an aggregator and the default function D(k;z), hence A(U;k) is
also lower-hemicontinuous. We have that the current period utility functions are continuous
in k and the feasibility correspondence is nonempty, compact valued and continuous. The
result follows from the Maximum Theorem. Furthermore, the set of maximizers k￿0 (k) is an
37upper-hemicontinuous correspondence. The latter part is immediate from the properties of
W (k) and V (k). ￿
Proof of Lemma 5: To show a) suppose that Iy (kt) > 0 but (u0 (cx (kt)) > u0 (cy (kt))).
Consider a deviation where the consumption of the home good is lowered by " and the
consumption of the importable increased by ", leaving total investment constant. We obtain
an increase in the utility of the agent. Points b) and c) can be proved using similar reasoning.
￿
Proof of Proposition 5: We characterize the problem through Lagrange multipliers.
Assume that Lagrange multipliers exist.












t ) + u(c
y
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+￿t (f (kt) ￿ zt ￿ Ix
t ￿ cx
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t in period t ￿ 1 are respectively
￿
t (u0 (cx

























￿t (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
￿1￿t￿1 + ￿tf0 (kt)
￿
= ￿tDk (kt;zt) (24)
￿
t (￿￿t + ’tp + ￿t) = ￿tDz (kt;zt) (25)
￿
t (￿t ￿ ￿t + ￿t) = 0 (26)
￿
t (￿t ￿ ’t + ￿t) = 0 (27)
plus the additional equations from FOC with respect to the multipliers
(1 ￿ ￿)kt + Ix
t + I
y
t ￿ kt+1 = 0 (28)
f (kt) ￿ zt ￿ Ix
t ￿ cx





t = 0 (30)
We impose multiplier values on the ￿rst order conditions that are obtained in the autarky
steady state and verify that the sequence of Lagrange multipliers f￿tg
1
t=0 are summable and





t = 0, D(k;0) = W (k). The constraints 0 ￿ cx
t ;0 ￿ c
y
t;0 ￿ zt;0 ￿ Ix
t are nonbinding
and the corresponding Lagrange multipliers are zero. After imposing these conditions we can
rewrite the ￿rst order conditions as
￿

























￿t (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
￿1￿t￿1 + ￿tf0 (k￿)
￿
= ￿tDk (k￿;0) (33)
38￿
t (￿￿t + ’tp) = ￿tDz (k￿;0) (34)
￿t = ￿t (35)
￿t = ’t ￿ ￿t (36)






















It must be true that ￿t
￿t￿1 < 1 for the sequence f￿tg
1
t=0 to be summable. This implies
u0 (cx￿) > ￿pu0 (0) noting that Dz (k;0) = pu0 (0). We can also note that there can be no
other steady state with Iy = 0 than at that with k￿ (which at this point does not mean that
no trade at k￿ steady state is possible { see Lemma 7). This can be seen by using eq. (33)
and substituting from eq. (34). The only way that ￿t
￿t￿1 is equal to the expression obtained
from eq. (38) is when ￿ (f0 (k) + (1 ￿ ￿)) = 0 or when k = k￿. ￿
Proof of Lemma 6: We start by showing that k￿ < k￿￿ < k￿￿￿ when investment is
conducted at the steady state from the importable. It is easy to construct a pro￿table devia-
tion under the assumption that k￿￿￿ < k￿￿ but one cannot verify that it is feasible, therefore
contradicting the assumption. We need to revert to the analysis of the ￿rst order conditions
of the problem.
From equations (22){(24) and (26){(27) we obtain
u0 (cx)f0 (k) ￿ u0 (cy)
￿
￿
￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿














Dk (k;z) ￿ ￿
￿1u0 (cy)
￿





u0 (cx)f0 (k) ￿ u0 (cy)
￿
￿
￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿









￿t > 1; and assuming
￿
Dk (k;z) ￿ ￿
￿1u0 (cy)
￿
< 0 this yields





Dk (k;z)(pu0 (cy) ￿ u0 (cx))
Dz (k;z)u0 (cx)
￿￿







￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿





Dz(k;z) < (1 ￿ ￿) for the multipliers to be
summable we obtain
(1 ￿ ￿)Dk (k;z) < (1 ￿ ￿)Dk (k;z) (39)
a contradiction. We also notice that













￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(40)












f0 (k) < ￿
￿1 ￿ 1 + ￿ = f0 (k￿)
so that k￿￿ > k￿.
For the case with the home good used for investment at the steady state, we obtain
u0 (cx)
￿
f0 (k) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
￿1￿
￿














Dk (k;z) ￿ ￿
￿1u0 (cx)
￿
> 0 then f0 (k) > f0 (k￿). O/w we obtain a contradiction as above
in (39). However, we can obtain a condition similar to inequality (40) and see that it always
must be true that f0 (k) < f0 (k￿). Hence, there can be no steady state with trade and the
home good being used for investment reasons. ￿
Proof of Lemma 7: Start from a steady state with trade and consider the default option.
We need to show that D(k￿￿;z (k￿￿)) > V (k￿￿) for some ^ ￿ where double asterisks denote
steady state values where trade is present and Iy > 0.
Notice that




(u(f (k￿￿) ￿ Ix
t ) + u(pz (k￿￿) ￿ I
y






















t is the optimal investment at the analyzed steady state. We have that
W (k￿￿) > u(f (k￿￿)) and substitute for the steady state value of V (k￿￿).
b D(k￿￿;z (k￿￿)) ￿ V (k￿￿) (41)
= u
￿










+ ￿ (W (k￿￿) ￿ V (k￿￿))
= u
￿























We will show that for a ￿ small enough the above expression is higher than zero, preventing
any steady state with trade to exist.








> 0 for small ￿. Suppose that the






















Now if ￿ is small we show that
















t > ￿f (k￿￿) (43)
At the steady state with trade and investment in Iy > 0 we know that from the FOC character-
ization in eqs. (22)-(30) it must be the case then that u0 (pz￿￿ ￿ Iy￿￿) < u0 (f (k￿￿) ￿ z￿￿) so
40that z￿ ￿ 1
p+1f (k). It su￿ces that ￿ ￿ 1









We now investigate when the remainder
u
￿




















Using concavity properties of the utility function we can rewrite eq. (44):
z￿￿u0 ￿














Using concavity and the fact that u(0) = 0
^ ￿
















Combining (45) and (46) we have that
z￿￿u0 ￿





(pz￿￿ ￿ ￿k￿￿)u0 (0) + z￿￿u0 ￿
f (k￿￿) ￿ I
x;￿￿
t
￿￿ > ^ ￿ (47)
We observe that by working with the denominator we can ￿nd a limiting value for the ex-
pression (47) as
z￿￿u0 ￿





(pz￿￿ ￿ ￿k￿￿)u0 (0) + z￿￿u0 ￿









((p + 1)z￿ ￿ ￿k￿)u0 (0)
>
u0 ￿




((p + 1))u0 (0)
> ^ ￿ (48)
Therefore, for su￿ciently small values of ^ ￿ the expression (41) is positive, as desired. Now
we need to inspect the possibility of a steady state with trade and Ix > 0. Imposing steady
state conditions with trade on eqs. (22){(30) and solving for the sequence of multipliers
f￿tg
1
t=0 we come to a contradiction unless ￿ (f0 (k) + (1 ￿ ￿)) = 1 (see Lemma 6) so that the
only steady state then would be at the autarkic steady state. But we note by Lemma 6 that
at k￿ there cannot be a steady state with positive trade. ￿
A.4 Countries included in the estimation
Algeria, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Estonia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indone-
sia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea Rep., Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon,
Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozam-
bique, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rus-
sian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United
Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia.
41A.5 Figures and Empirical results tables
Figure 3: Average GDP per capita vs. trade/GDP ratio in 2001-2003.
Variables in logs, GDP in PPP terms.
Source: WDI database, World Bank.
42Figure 4: Average maximum tenors for forfaiting contracts vs. trade/GDP
ratio 2001-2003.
Variables in logs, tenors in years.
Data from 5 agencies (NedBank, Standard Bank London, WestLB Forfaiting, Credit Lyonnais
Forfaiting, Hungarian International Trade Finance) - horizontal axis and average log of trade per
GDP ratio in 2001-2003. Source: Tenors - Trade Finance, openness - WDI database, World Bank.





















Figure 5: Simulation results, endowment economy.
Value function iterations.





t + 1) + ln(c
y










k*** ka k* k
V(k),W(k),U(k)
kc
Figure 6: An example of hypothetical value functions.
1) Line labeled V (k) denotes the value function of the unconstrained problem.
2) Line W (k) denotes the value function of the problem in autarky.
3) Line U (k) denotes the value function of the constrained problem.
The points k￿ and k￿￿￿ are steady states with no trade and unconstrained trade respectively.
k*** ka k* k kc
0
g
k*** ka k* k kc
0
g
Figure 7: Possible growth rates (￿) in the economy with constraints associated
with the example of the value function in Figure 6.





































t + 1) + ln(c
y
t + 1); f (k) = k￿;
g(Ix;Iy) = Ix + Iy; ￿ = 0:55; p = 1:3; ￿ = 0:9; ￿ = 0:25.
There are two steady states at k￿ (autarky) and k￿￿ (constrained trade with the outside world).































































































































Figure 9: Comparative statics, example with multiple equilibria.
Capital vs. trade/production ratio.
Changes in the concavity of the period component function (panels 1-2), prices p (panel 3-4) and
depreciation rates ￿ (panels 5-6).
Base speci￿cation: u(cx;cy) = ln(cx + 1) + ln(cy + 1); ￿ = 0:55, ￿ = 0:25; p = 1:3;
￿ = 0:9:




























































































































Figure 10: Comparative statics, example with multiple equilibria.
Capital vs. trade/production ratio.
Changes in discount factors (panels 7-8), capital intensity (panels 9-10) and rate of contract
enforcement (panels 11-12).
Base speci￿cation: u(cx;cy) = ln(cx + 1) + ln(cy + 1); ￿ = 0:55; ￿ = 0:25; p = 1:3;
￿ = 0:9:





























































































































































Figure 11: Comparative statics, example with no multiple equilibria.
Capital vs. trade/production ratio.
Changes in the concavity of the period component function (panels 1-2), prices p (panel 3-4) and
depreciation rates ￿ (panels 5-6).
Base speci￿cation unless noted: u(cx;cy) = ln(cx + 1) + ln(cy + 1); ￿ = 0:6; ￿ = 0:2;
p = 1:3; ￿ = 0:8:












































































































































Figure 12: Comparative statics, example with no multiple equilibria.
Capital vs. trade/production ratio.
Changes in discount factors (panels 7-8), capital intensity (panels 9-10) and rate of contract
enforcement (panels 11-12).
Base speci￿cation unless noted: u(cx;cy) = ln(cx + 1) + ln(cy + 1); ￿ = 0:6, ￿ = 0:2;
p = 1:3; ￿ = 0:8:























Figure 13: Simulation results, production economy.
Capital vs. trade/production ratio.







t+1); f (k) = k￿; ￿ =0.55; p =1.3;
￿=0.9; ￿=0.25. Trade cost values imposed ￿=0.1 and ￿=0.2.
51Table 1: Explanation of variable coding
Name Explanation
lnTeni logarithm of average tenor of importer
lnTenj logarithm of average tenor of exporter
lnIIi logarithm of Institutional Investor ranking (importer)
lnIIj logarithm of Institutional Investor ranking (exporter)
lnYi=Popi logarithm of GDP in PPP terms per capita (importer)
lnYj=Popj logarithm of GDP in PPP terms per capita (exporter)
lnYi logarithm of GDP in PPP terms (importer)
lnYj logarithm of GDP in PPP terms (exporter)
lnAreai logarithm of the area of the importer
lnAreaj logarithm of the area of the exporter
lnLatiLatj logarithm of the product of the distance from the equator
lnDistij logarithm of distance between countries
FTAij an FTA between countries in the dyad (0,1)
lnMFNiMFNj logarithm of the product of a simple average of applied MFN tari￿s
Contigij countries in the dyad share a border (0,1)
Com Lang Offij countries have same o￿cial language (0,1)
Com Lang Ethij countries have same ethnic language (0,1)
ComColij countries had a common colonizer (0,1)
SameCtryij countries belonged to the same country in XX century (0,1)
LandlockNumij number of landlocked countries in the dyad (0, 1, 2)
IslandNumij number of islands in the dyad (0, 1, 2)
Time time period
52Table 2: Gravity equation estimation results
Dependent variable: Between Between Fixed e￿ects Between
ln(Imports/YiYj) (IV)
lnTeni .157*** .409* .157**
(.094) (.148) (.071)






lnYi=Popi .237* .186** 2.525* .132***
(.056) (.078) (.942) (.072)
lnYj=Popj .522* .575* -.501 .264*
(.056) (.078) (.946) (.072)
lnYi -.09* -.095* -1.232 -.096*
(.027) (.03) (.975) (.027)
lnYj .165* .17* -.133 .126*
(.027) (.03) (.986) (.027)
lnAreai -.042* -.038** -.033***
(.017) (.018) (.018)
lnAreaj .029 .018 .046**
(.017) (.018) (.018)
lnLatiLatj .151 .107* .146*
(.022) (.023) (.022)
lnDistij -1.189* -1.111* -1.212*
(.038) (.042) (.038)
FTAij 1.337* 1.156* 1.321*
(.214) (.276) (.213)
lnMFNiMFNj -3.178* -1.606* -3.238*
(.392) (.215) (.392)
Contigij .612* .567* .61*
(.175) (.193) (.179)
Com Lang Offij .596* .497* .561*
(.14) (.158) (.14)
Com Lang Ethij .417* .681* .424*
(.125) (.14) (.124)
ComColij 1.00* 1.01* .927*
(.112) (.126) (.112)
SameCtryij .934* .86* .669*
(.233) (.256) (.242)
LandlockNumij -.483* -.408* -.433*
(.062) (.069) (.063)




Observations 11175 9252 11175 10944
R2 0.48 0.49 0.02 0.48
Standard deviations in parentheses. Symbols *,**,*** denote that the variable is signi￿cant at 1, 5 and 10
percent level. Variable codes in Table 1.
53